A Return to Purity of Creed

Imam al-Ghazzali (RA) Aqida - Tenets of Belief

Abū ḤHāmed Muhammad ibn Muhammad Ghazālī

Imam al-Ghazzali (RA)
(b.450.AH in Persia -1058CE) - (d.505.AH -1111CE)

Was fondly referred to as the "Hujjat-ul-lslam", Proof of Islam, He is honoured as a scholar and a saint by learned men all over the world.

Aqida - Tenets of Belief

Excerpts from al-Ghazali's il-Jam al-awwami an ilm al-kalam translated as
A Return to Purity of Creed

by Ustadh Abdullah bin Hamid Ali
[PDFs]

Chapter 1:

The Creed Of The Salaf Regarding Allegorical Reports

“...I proceed…You have asked me (may Allah give you right guidance) about the reports that give the impression of there being resemblance [between Allah and His creation] to the hooligans (ra_a) and fools among the deviant crpto-anthropomorphists (_ashwiyya)1, whereas they have believed about Allah and His attributes things that He is high beyond and sanctified from having—such as “the form,” the “hand,” the “mouth,” “the foot,” “the descent,” “the transference from place to place,” the “sitting on the Throne and the establishment,” and other things of a like nature that they have adopted from the literal indications of the reports and the physical forms they depict.

[You asked about the fact that] they have claimed that what they believe in this regard is the belief of the Salaf, thus I wanted to explain to you what the belief of the Salaf was, in order to clarify what is compulsory for the general masses of people to believe about the reports. This will remove the veil that is obscuring the truth with respect to it, and distinguish between what must be studied and looked for, and what must be abstained and refrained from indulging in.

For this, I have answered your request, seeking closeness to Allah _, by revealing the unequivocal truth without any flattery, [without] observing a [particular] side [in the debate], and [without] maintaining any partisan bias toward any adherent of a particular madhhab—since the truth is more deserving of observation, and truthfulness and impartiality are more deserving of preservation.

I ask Allah _ for straightness and success----and He is [most] fit for answering he who calls on Him.

Now, I will arrange the book into three chapters:

[1] a chapter explaining the reality of the madhhab of the Salaf with regard to these reports;
[2] a chapter concerning the proof indicating that the truth in its regard is the madhhab of the Salaf and that he who acts contrary to them is an innovator; and
[3] a chapter with respect to [a number of] useful scattered sections related to this matter.
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1 This term was applied to some of the Hanbali scholars like those who Ibn al-Jawzi rebutted in his Daf’ Shubah al- Tashbih, like Qadi Abu Ya’la, Ibn Hamid, and Ibn Zaghuni.
It also applies to anyone who adopts a similar creed as those who say that Allah has a hand unlike hands, an eye unlike eyes, and a foot unlike feet. This is just as the blatant Anthropomorphists said, “Allah is a body unlike bodies.”
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CHAPTER 1

THE CREED OF THE SALAF REGARDING ALLEGORICAL REPORTS

Know that the unequivocal truth, over which there is no dispute between those possessing inner discernment, is [in] the approach of the Salaf (madhhab al-Salaf)—meaning the approach of the Companions and the Successors. Now, let me illustrate that along with its proofs, I proceed. The reality of the approach of the Salaf—which is the truth in our view—is that any layperson who confronts one of these controversial ambiguous Gadiths is obliged to conform to seven matters:

[1] Exoneration; [2] Affirmation; [3] Acknowledgement of one’s inability; [4] Silence; [5] Abstinence; [6] Restraint; and then [7] Yielding to the People of Knowledge.

As for exoneration (taqdis), by this I mean [that a person is] to absolve the Lord, Glory and Highness be to Him, from bodily characteristics and the subordinate characters [of a body].

As for affirmation (ta_diq), this is to believe in what he (the Prophet) _ said, that what he mentioned is truth, that he is truthful in whatever he says, and that it is truth in accord with what he said and intended.

As for acknowledging one’s inability (al-i_tiraf bi al-‘ajz), this is for one to acknowledge that knowing his (i.e. the Prophet’s & Allah’s) intent is beyond the scope of one’s capacity, and that such a thing is not any of his business or profession.

As for silence (sukut), this is to not ask about its meaning, not to indulge in it, to know that asking about it is an illicit innovation (bid_a), that by indulging in it one is bringing serious risk to his faith, and that he is on the verge of rejecting faith by indulging in it without knowing.

As for abstinence (al-imsak), this is for him not to alter or replace those expressions with another language, not to add or subtract from it, or by combining or separating [any words]. Rather, one is only to utter that particular expression or word in that particular manner of mention, grammatical classification, declension, and wording.
As for restraint (al-kaff), this is to keep one’s heart from searching and pondering over it.

As for yielding to its specialists (al-taslim li ahlihi), this is for one not to believe that just because such a thing is confusing to him due to his inability, that it was also confusing to Allah’s messenger _, to the prophets, to the truly sincere in faith (siddiqin), or the friends of God (awliya’). So these are seven protocols that every single one of the Salaf believed to be an obligation of all laypeople—and it should not be thought that the Salaf—disagreed about any part of that.

The Fifth Protocol:

Abstaining From Meddling with the Stated Words (al-Imsak)

The Fifth Protocol:

Abstaining From Meddling with the Stated Words (al-Imsak)
This is an obligation for the general masses to confine themselves to the words of these reports and to abstain from meddling with them in six different ways:

[1] By explaining (tafsir);
[2] By interpreting figuratively (ta’wil);
[3] By altering (ta_rif);
[4] By making logical assumptions (tafri_)
[5] By joining what is separated (jam_), and
[6] By separating what is joined together (tafriq).

TAFSIR – Offering Explanations

I. The first is tafsir (explaining). What I mean by it is for one to substitute the word of another language for what it is in Arabic or one with the same meaning in Persian or Turkish. In other words, it is only permissible to utter the word found [in Arabic], because there are some Arabic words that do not have an equivalent in Persian. There are others that have a Persian equivalent, but it was not customary for Persians to use [such words] as metaphors in the same fashion that Arabs used them as metaphors. In addition, there are those [words] that are homonyms in Arabic, which may not be homonyms in foreign languages (‘ajamiyya).

A. As for the first, an example of it is [the word] “al-istiwa’.”
Surely Persians do not possess a word that equally conveys—among Persians—the [same] meaning that the word “al-istiwa’” conveys to Arabs, whereas it does not contain any added ambiguity [in Persian]. Its Persian equivalent is “Rast Be-estad”, and these are two different words.

The first (al-istiwa’) informs of a raising and leveling out of something with respect to a thing that is imagined to become curved and crooked.

And the second (i.e. rast be-estad), informs of stillness and firm establishment with respect to a thing that was imagined to have been in motion and restless. Thus the foreign language indicating those meanings is more apparent than they are indicated by the [Arabic] word “al-istiwa’.” So when it happens that they are dissimilar in what they suggest and
indicate, this one is not [considered] equivalent to the first. It is only permitted to substitute a word with one that is equivalent to it in every respect, not with something that is antonymous and differs from it even if in the slightest and most minute fashion.

B. An example of the second is the “finger” (i_ba_) used metaphorically in Arabic to mean “a favor” (ni_ma). It is [sometimes] said [by Arabs], “Fulan has a finger with me.”
That is, [I owe him] “a favor.”
In Persian that translates as “angosht”, but it was not customary for the non-Arab to use such a metaphor.
Arabs [on the other hand] were very liberal in their employment of figurative expressions and metaphor, more so than non-Arabs.

As a matter of fact, there is no comparison between the broad use [of metaphors] amongst the Arabs and the lack of such creativity among the non-Arabs. So if the metaphor employed happens to be pleasant to the Arabs but unattractive to the non-Arab, the heart will have an aversion to what is unattractive and the ear will reject it and not incline to accept it. Likewise, if the two things are dissimilar, then the explanation (tafsir) given will not be a substitution of an equivalent. Rather, it will be [a substitution] with a non-equivalent, but it is only permissible to substitute with something that is equivalent.

C. An example of the third is the [Arabic] word “_ayn.”
For verily those who explain it do so with the most apparent of its meanings. Thus one will say, “It is a material object,” even though it is a homonym in the language of the Arabs [that fluctuates] between [meaning] the “eye”, “a spring”, “gold”, and “the sun.”
A word has no ‘material form’ (jism) when it happens to fluctuate in meaning to such an extent. Similar are the [Arabic] words “janb”, and “wajh,” which are similar to it [in ambiguity].

For this reason, we hold that it is forbidden to substitute words and [compulsory] to restrict one’s self to [using] only the Arab [expressions].

However if it is said, “If you make the claim that this type of disparity exists in all words, it would be incorrect, because there is no difference [in meaning] between [the Arabic word] “khubz” and [the Persian word] “nan” (bread) or between [the Arabic] “la_m” and [the Persian] “gusht” (meat)—and if you acknowledge that [complete congruity exists] in some [words], then forbid substitution when there is disparity [between their meanings], not when there is complete congruity.” [If this is said], then the response would be that this disparity exists in some [words], but not in all.

For perhaps the [Arabic] word “yad” and the [Persian] word “dast” are equivalent in both languages—in their homonymous nature, their metaphorical usage, and in all other respects.

However, [when the meaning chosen] divides into what is possible and what is not possible—and one is unable to distinguish between the two of them or become acquainted with the minute points of dissimilarity with clarity and ease for any of the creation—rather, much confusion occurs in its regard and the point of dissimilarity are not distinguished from the points of similarity, then we either have to close the door out of caution, since there is no need or necessity to substitute [words], or we have to open the door and plunge the general masses of the people into the precipice of peril. How I wish I knew which of the matters is more resolute and more cautious when the thing being meddled with is the essence of God and His attributes! I do not believe that there are any sane religious people who do not believe that this matter is dangerous.

For verily the peril in the Divine attributes must be avoided. How not, when the sacred law has obliged the woman who has had sexual intercourse to undergo a waiting period to insure that her womb is unoccupied by a child and out of caution against the mixing up of one another’s lineages—as a precaution—for maintaining the rulings of guardianship, inheritance, and all else that results from blood ties?

They (i.e. the scholars) said in spite of this that, the waiting period is a duty upon the infertile woman, the post-menopausal, the girl who has still yet to have a menstrual cycle, and in the case of coitus interuptus (‘azl), because when it comes to the interior of the wombs, only the Knower of Indiscernible matters (Allah) is acquainted with them—for verily He knows what is in all wombs. Thus if we had opened the door of reflection to specific detail, we would be riding on the deck of peril, so obliging [the woman] to undergo the waiting period (‘idda) in unrelated cases is easier to deal with than riding on the back of peril [through the discussion of Allah’s being]. So just as obliging [a woman] to undergo the waiting period is a judgment of the Sacred Law, declaring the substitution of words to be forbidden is [also] a judgment of the sacred law that has been established by scholarly endeavor (ijtihad) and by placing more importance on doing what is more appropriate.

Thus it is known that being careful about reports about Allah, about His attributes, and about what He meant by the words of the Qur’an is more important and more appropriate than being careful about the waiting period and all things that the jurists have taken precautions about that are of this kind.

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