The British War Against Nasser

IV. The British War Against Nasser

In their dealings with Nasser the British used any means necessary, including espionage, diplomacy, bribery and even direct military might to retain control over Egypt and the Suez Canal. The newly founded CIA also became interested in Egypt when Nasser showed signs of tilting to the Soviet Union. Aburish explains how this new avenue of intrigue evolved,

    "According to CIA agent Miles Copeland, the Americans began looking for a Muslim Billy Graham around 1955... When finding or creating a Muslim Billy Graham proved elusive, the CIA began to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim mass organization founded in Egypt but with followers throughout the Arab Middle East... This signalled the beginning of an alliance between the traditional regimes and mass Islamic movements against Nasser and other secular forces." (1)

The CIA was following the example of British Intelligence and sought to use Islam to further its goals. They wanted to find a charismatic religious leader that they could promote and control and they began to cooperate with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. With the rise of Nasser the Brotherhood was also courted more seriously by the pro-Western Arab regimes of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They needed all the popular support that they could muster against the rise of Nasser-inspired Arab nationalism to keep their regimes intact.

The Muslim Brotherhood was an obvious ally against Nasser, because he had abolished it from Egypt after it was involved in a failed assassination attempt on his life in 1954. The Brotherhood rejected Nasser's policy that, for the most part, kept religion out of politics. Officially the Brotherhood was an outlawed organization, but it remained influential and active within Egypt working against the secular regime, often hand-in-hand with British Intelligence. In June of 1955 MI6 was already approaching the Brotherhood in Syria to agitate against the new government that showed strong left-wing tendencies and a desire to merge with Egypt (2). The Brotherhood became an even more important asset after Nasser announced the Egyptian takeover of the Suez. Author Stephen Dorril documents how this move was viewed from Britain,

"On 26 July in Alexandria, in a calm speech, but one that was described by London as hysterical, Nasser made his nationalisation announcement, which from a strictly legal point of view was no more 'than a decision to buy out the shareholders.' That night in Downing Street, [British Prime Minister] Eden's bitterness at the decision was not concealed from his guests... Eden summoned a council of war, which continued until 4 a.m. An emotional Prime Minister told his colleagues that Nasser could not be allowed, in Eden's phrase, 'to have his hand on our windpipe.' The 'muslim Mussolini' must be 'destroyed.' Eden added: 'I want him removed and I don't give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt.'" (3)

Former Prime Minister Churchill had fueled Eden's fire by counseling him about the Egyptians, saying, "Tell them if we have any more of their cheek we will set the Jews on them and drive them into the gutter, from which they should have never emerged." (4)

Sir Anthony Nutting, a member of the Foreign Office at the time, recalls an irate phone call from Eden who was upset at the slow pace of the campaign against Nasser. Eden raged, "What's all this poppycock you've sent me? ... What's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or "neutralizing" him, as you call it? I want him destroyed, can't you understand? I want him murdered..." (5)

To prepare the way for the desired coup the British Information Research Department (IRD) was called into action. They ratcheted up their efforts to control radio broadcasts into Egypt and they planted false stories in the BBC, the London Press Service and the Arab News Agency. Forged documents were created that suggested that Nasser was planning to take over the entire Middle East oil trade, and a bogus report was disseminated that alleged that Egyptian dissidents were being sent to a concentration camp manned by ex-Nazis. (6)

The British had a problem though in deciding who would take over Egypt after Nasser's removal. MI-6 held meetings with members of the old Wafd party and allies of former premier Nahas Pasha. The original Free Officer's leader General Neguib, who had been removed and placed under house arrest by Nasser, was viewed as a possible president, and some British circles even advocated that Prince Abdul Monheim, the most 'presentable' Egyptian royal, be made king. (7)

According to Dorril, the most important recruit to the British plot to topple Nasser was an Egyptian Intelligence officer Isameddine Mahmoud Khalil, who was maintained as a contact by supplying him with intelligence about Egypt's most pressing enemy: Israel. Dorril offers a Mossad chief's remarks about this situation who said, "Harming Israel's security by handing over secret information about her did not apparently trouble the conscience of the British." This was a very complicated time for the British, because they were presently working with Israel to coordinate a military attack on Egypt which eventually took place in October. (8)

Evidently, the lack of a clear-cut candidate to replace Nasser did not stop the coup plotters. Dorril concludes that, "MI6 did not believe, however, that it was absolutely necessary to have an alternative in place. The Service was confident that once Nasser was overthrown suitable candidates would emerge." (9)

In late August Nasser acted against the growing threat from British Intelligence. The offices of the Arab News Agency were raided and a number of employees were arrested and confessed to being British agents. Two British diplomats were expelled, one of them, J. B. Flux, had "been in contact with 'students of a religious inclination' with the idea of 'encouraging fundamentalist riots that could provide an excuse for military intervention to protect European lives.'" Other British "businessmen" and "diplomats" were arrested or expelled as well, and because of Nasser's effective offensive Dorril writes that immediately prior to the Suez War British Intelligence found that it was left "With no assets in the country," and that "MI6 had to use outside agents for its assassination plans." (10)

In the end all of this British subversion and agitation failed, even after they decided upon the direct military confrontation that was played out in the Suez War of October 1956. Popular Egyptian support for Nasser was just too much, and the international community sided with Nasser against the British as well, forcing the Suez Canal to be returned to Egypt. Nasser emerged leading an Egypt finally free from British control.

Since then Britain has continually waged a low-level covert war against Egyptian governments: against Nasser until his death, against Sadat who took over, and even against Mubarak after him, up until this very day. The secular Egyptian government has traditionally been one of the toughest enemies of Islamic terrorism, whereas the single most important backer of Egyptian terror groups has been Britain. This last statement goes entirely against the preconceptions of most British and American citizens, but in the pages that follow we will offer proof to back it up.