Ibn Taymiyya, Taqi al-Din (1263-1328)

Ibn Taymiyya, Taqi al-Din (1263-1328)

Ibn Taymiyya was a staunch defender of Sunni Islam based on strict adherence to the Qur'an and authentic sunna (practices) of the Prophet Muhammad. He believed that these two sources contain all the religious and spiritual guidance necessary for our salvation in the hereafter. Thus he rejected the arguments and ideas of both philosophers and Sufis regarding religious knowledge, spiritual experiences and ritual practices. He believed that logic is not a reliable means of attaining religious truth and that the intellect must be subservient to revealed truth. He also came into conflict with many of his fellow Sunni scholars because of his rejection of the rigidity of the schools of jurisprudence in Islam. He believed that the four accepted schools of jurisprudence had become stagnant and sectarian, and also that they were being improperly influenced by aspects of Greek logic and thought as well as Sufi mysticism. His challenge to the leading scholars of the day was to return to an understanding of Islam in practice and in faith, based solely on the Qur'an and sunna.

Ibn Taymiyya was born in Harran, Syria, and died in Damascus in ah 728/ad 1328. He lived in a time when the Islamic world was suffering from external aggression and internal strife. The crusaders had not been fully expelled from the Holy Land, and the Mongols had all but destroyed the eastern Islamic empire when they captured Baghdad in ah 656/ad 1258. In Egypt, the Mamluks had just come to power and were consolidating their hold over Syria. Within Muslim society, Sufi orders were spreading beliefs and practices not condoned by orthodox Islam, while the orthodox schools of jurisprudence were stagnant in religious thought and practice. It was in this setting of turmoil and conflict that Ibn Taymiyya formulated his views on the causes of the weakness of the Muslim nations and on the need to return to the Qur'an and sunna (practices) as the only means for revival.

Although Ibn Taymiyya was educated in the Hanbali school of thought, he soon reached a level of scholarship beyond the confines of that school. He was fully versed in the opinions of the four schools, which helped lead him to the conclusion that blind adherence to one school would bring a Muslim into conflict with the letter and spirit of Islamic law based on the Qur'an and sunna. Similarly, he had acquired a deep understanding of philosophical and mystical texts. In particular, he focused on the works of Ibn Sina and Ibn al-'Arabi as examples of philosophical and mystical deviation in Islam, respectively. Both of these trends had come to exert strong influence on Muslim scholars and lay people alike.
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It was in this setting of turmoil and conflict that Ibn Taymiyya formulated his views on the causes of the weakness of the Muslim nations and on the need to return to the Qur'an and sunna (practices) as the only means for revival.
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Ibn Taymiyya placed primary importance on revelation as the only reliable source of knowledge about God and about a person's religious duties towards him. The human intellect ('aql) and its powers of reason must be subservient to revelation. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the only proper use of 'aql was to understand Islam in the way the Prophet and his companions did, and then to defend it against deviant sects. When discussing the nature of God, he argued, one must accept the descriptions found in the Qur'an and sunna and apply the orthodox view of not asking how (bi-la kayf) particular attributes exist in God. This means that one believes in all of the attributes of God mentioned in the Qur'an and sunna without investigating the nature of these, because the human mind is incapable of understanding the eternal God. For example, one accepts that God is mounted upon a throne above the heavens without questioning how this is possible. This same attitude is held for all of God's attributes such as his sight, his hearing or his hand.

This view is very much opposed to the philosophical view of God as First Cause and as being devoid of attributes. Thus the philosophical argument that the oneness of God precludes a multiplicity of attributes was not acceptable to Ibn Taymiyya, because God says that he is one and that he has various attributes. This denial of the attributes of God based on rationalism was adopted by the Mu'tazila (see Ash'ariyya and Mu'tazila), of whom Ibn Taymiyya was especially critical. Even the more orthodox views of the Ash'aris, who accepted seven attributes basic to God, were criticized by Ibn Taymiyya. However, he did not go so far as to declare these two groups heretical, for they deviated only in their interpretation of God's nature. But he did not spare the label of apostate for those philosophers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina who, in addition to the denial of God's attributes, also denied the createdness of the world and believed in the emanation of the universe from God.

Ibn Taymiyya attacked the idea of emanation not only in its philosophical but also in its mystical context, as adopted by the Sufis (see Mystical philosophy in Islam). He felt that the beliefs and practices of the Sufis were far more dangerous than were the ideas of the philosophers. The latter were a small elite group that had little direct effect on the masses. The Sufis, however, were widespread and had a large popular following. However, Ibn Taymiyya saw a link between the ideas of the philosophers and those of the Sufis, even though apparently they had little in common.

The main tenet of Sufi thought as propounded by Ibn al-'Arabi is the concept of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud). Through this belief, Sufis think they are able to effect a merging of their souls with God's essence. That is, when God reveals his truth to an individual, that person realizes that there is no difference between God and the self. Ibn Taymiyya saw a link between the Sufi belief of wahdat al-wujud and the philosophical concept of emanation. Although the philosopher would deny that a human soul could flow into, and thus be, the First Cause, the mystical experience of the Sufis took them beyond the realm of intellectual discourse. According to the mystic, a merging occurred but could not be expressed in rational terms. For Ibn Taymiyya, both the philosopher and the mystic were deluded, the former by reliance on a limited human intellect and the latter by excessive emotions.

Ibn Taymiyya's argument against the Sufis is on two levels. First, there is the theological position that God has attributes and that one of these attributes is God as creator. Ibn Taymiyya believed that the Qur'an firmly establishes that God is the one who created, originated and gave form to the universe. Thus there exists a distinction between God the creator and the created beings. This is an absolute distinction with no possibility of merging. He then went on to say that those who strip God of his attributes and deny that he is the creator are just one step away from falling into the belief of wahdat al-wujud. This is the basis for the second part of his argument. Ibn Taymiyya believed that a Sufi is simply someone who is overcome by an outburst of emotion. For example, someone may deny God's attributes but could then be overwhelmed by a feeling of love for God. However, the basis of that person's knowledge is not the authentic information from the Qur'an, and so their weak intellectual foundation collapses with the onslaught of emotion. For according to Ibn Taymiyya, sense perception and emotions cannot be trusted, and the likelihood of being led astray by them is compounded when one has a basis of knowledge which is itself errant and deviant. One holds a proper belief in God and maintains a proper relationship with him, Ibn Taymiyya argued, by establishing a foundation of knowledge based on the Qur'an and authentic sunna.

See also: Ibn al-'Arabi; Islamic theology; Law, Islamic philosophy of; Mystical philosophy in Islam; Neoplatonism in Islamic philosophy

JAMES PAVLIN
Copyright © 1998, Routledge.
List of works

Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) Mas'ala fi al-'aql wa al-nafs (Concerning the Matter of the Intellect and the Soul), in A.A.M. Qasim and M.A.A. Qasim (eds) Majmu' fatawa Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya, vol. 9, Riyad: Matba'ah al-Hukama, 1996. (This is a short essay in which Ibn Taymiyya summarizes his views on the relationship between the intellect and the soul.)

Ibn Taymiyya---- (1263-1328) al-'Ubudiyya fi al-Islam (The Concept of Worship in Islam), Cairo: al-Matba'ah al-Salafiyya. (This is one of Ibn Taymiyya's most important statements concerning issues of faith and belief in Islam. He speaks extensively on matters of predestination, love for God and Sufi concepts of the annihilation of the soul.)

---- (1263-1328) al-Jawab al-sahih li-man baddala din al-masah (The Correct Answer to the One Who Changed the Religion of the Messiah), trans. T.F. Michel, A Muslim Theologian's Response to Christianity, Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1984. (This is an abridged translation, with an excellent introduction to Ibn Taymiyya's polemics against various groups and an extensive bibliography.)

References and further reading

Bell, J.N. (1979) Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Islam, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. (This work investigates the role of love in the thinking of Hanbali scholars and shows how they defined it in opposition to philosophers and mystics.)

Hallaq, W.B. (1993) Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (An excellent translation of Ibn Taymiyya's most important arguments against Greek logic. The introduction and notes give depth and perspective to this very difficult topic. It also contains an extensive bibliography.)

Izutsu Toshihiko (1965) The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology: A Semantic Analysis of Iman and Islam, Yokohama: Yurindo Publishing Company. (Although this work focuses on the concept of belief in early Islam, the author makes extensive use of Ibn Taymiyya's theories to explain how orthodox scholars came to understand this term.)

Pavlin, J. (1996) 'Sunni Kalam and Theological Controversies', in S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds) History of Islamic Philosophy, London: Routledge, ch. 7, 105-18. (Includes a discussion of Ibn Taymiyya's view.)
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About ibn Taymiyya

Ibn Taymiya is Ahmad ibn Abd al-Salaam ibn Abdullah, Abu al-Abbas Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiya al-Harrani, born in Harran, east of Damascus, in 661/1263. A famous Hanbali scholar in Qur'anic exegesis (tafsir), hadith and jurisprudence, Ibn Taymiya was a voracious reader and author of great personal courage who was endowed with a compelling writing style and a keen memory. Dhahabi wrote of him,

"I never saw anyone faster at recalling the Qur'anic verses dealing with subjects he was discussing, or anyone who could remember hadith texts more vividly." Dhahabi estimates that his legal opinions on various subjects amount to three-hundred or more volumes.  

He was imprisoned during much of his life in Cairo, Alexandria, and Damascus for his writings, scholars of his time accusing him of believing Allah to be a corporeal entity because of what he mentioned in his al-aqida al-Hamawiyya and al-Wasitiyya and other works, such as that Allah's 'hand', 'foot', 'shin' and 'face' are literal (haqiqi) attributes, and that He is upon the Throne in person. The error in this is suggesting such attributes are literal is an innovation and unjustifiable inferance from the Qur'anic and hadith texts that mention them, for the way of early Muslims was mere acceptance of such expressions on faith without saying how they are meant, and without additions, subtractions, or substituting meanings imagined to be synonyms, while acknowledging Allah's absolute transcedence beyond the characteristics of created things, in conformity with the Qur'anic verse "There is nothing whatsoever like unto him" [Qur'an 42:11]. As for figurative interpretations that preserve the divine transcendence, scholars of tenents of faith have only had recourse to them in times when men of reprehensible innovation (bid'a), quoting hadiths and Qur'anic verses, have caused confusion in the minds of common Muslims as to whether Allah has attributes like those of His creation or whether He is transcendently beyond any image conceivable to the minds of men. Scholars' firmness in condemning those who have raised such confusions has traditionally been very uncompromising, and this is no doubt the reason that a number of the Imams of the Shafi'i school, among them Taqi al-Din Subki, Ibn Hajar Haytami and al-Izz ibn Jama'a, gave formal legal opinions (fatawa) that ibn Taymiya was misguided and misguiding in tenents of faith, and warned people from accepting his theories. The Hanafi scholar Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari has written

"Whoever thinks that all the scholars of his time joined in a single conspiracy against him from personal envy should rather impugn their own intelligence and understanding, after studying the repugnance of his deviations in beliefs and works, for which he was asked to repent time after time and moved from prison to prison until he passed on to what he'd sent ahead."  

While few deny that ibn Taymiya was a copious and eloquent writer and hadith scholar, his career, like that of others, demonstrates that a man may be outstanding in one field and yet suffer from radical deficiencies in another, the most reliable index of which is how a field's Imams regard his work in it. By this measure, indeed, by the standards of all previous Ahl al-Sunna scholars, it is clear that despite voluminous and influential written legacy, ibn Taymiya cannot be considered an authority on tenents of faith ('aqida), a field in which he made mistakes profoundly incompatible with the beliefs of Islam, as also with a number of his legal views that violated the scholarly consensus (ijma) of Sunni Muslims. It should be remembered that such matters are not the province of personal reasoning (ijtihad), whether Ibn Taymiya considered them to be so out of sincere conviction, or whether simply because, as Imam Subki said, "his learning exceeded his intelligence." He died in Damascus in 728/1328.  

Quoted from Reliance of the Traveller ['Umdat as-Salik] by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri translated by Nuh Ha Mim Keller

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