Monday 29 June 2015

The Attributes of God (Daf' Shubah al-Tashbh)

Nasser Saleh · Universiteit Twente

Title:

The Attributes of God (Daf' Shubah al-Tashbh)

By Imam Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Jawzi

Description:

Daf' Shubah al-Tashbh is a critique, censure, and refutation of the historical anthropomorphic leanings of some of the Hanbali scholars and learned. At the same time, it is a vindication of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal from the accusations of the anthropomorphism as well as the claim by some Hanbalis, that he adopted anthropomorphic beliefs, similar to theirs. Unmistakably, this work is a polemical commentary on the problematic Qur'anic verses and hadiths that fall under the mutashabih (allegorical and ambiguous) Qur'anic verses and prophetic traditions composed by the author, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597 AH), the author of the well-acclaimed book, Talbis Iblis (The Devils' Deception).

Unlike other books of this genre, this book is significant in that Ibn al-Jawzi offers an incisive critique of scholars of his own school, for which in return, Ibn al-Jawzi was criticised by those Hanbali (Salafi / ahluhadith sect ) and Hanbali (Salafi / ahluhadith sect )-leaning proponents.

This book is important for anyone who want to have deep understanding of the creed of Salafi / ahluhadith sect.

INTRODUCTION by Imam Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Jawzi

KNOW—MAY GOD, the Exalted, help you—that when I pursued the madhhab of Imam Ahmad, may God the Exalted have mercy on him, I found him to be of great stature with respect to the sciences. He excelled in the study of the juridical sciences and the views of the predecessors (Salaf ) to the point that not a single matter arises that he does not have a scriptural reference for or some form of remark to make. However, because he adheres to the approach of the Salaf, he only wrote what they transmitted.Therefore [it was only natural that] I found his madhhab void of the literary compositions whose kind was numerous amongst those [scholars]who follow a different approach [than him]. So, I wrote some detailed exegeses. Amongst them are: al-Mughni [that exists] in [several] volumes, Zad al-Masir,Tadhkirat al-Arib and others.

Concerning the sciences of hadith [I wrote a number of ] books, among them are: Jami‘ al-Masanid, al-Hada‘iq, Naqi al-Naql and many books regarding al-Jarh wa al-Ta‘dil (the science of weighing positive and negative factors for evaluating the reliability of hadith narrators). I have not found the Hanbalis to have a single commentary in the topic of comparative fiqh except that al-Qadi AbuYa‘la said:“I used to say, ‘what is it with the advocates of the madhhabs that they mention the variance of those who have opposing views but they do not bother to mention the views of Ahmad.’

Imam Ahmad kept the company of AbuYusuf at the start of his [scholastic] career as Yahya ibn Ma‘in says about him in his book,Ma‘rifa al-Tarikh wa al-‘Ilal,“I heard Ahmad ibn Hanbal say, ‘I kept the company of AbuYusuf, and then I kept company with others after his time.’”Ahmad used to preoccupy himself with the books of Muhammad ibn al-Hasan and would extract some abstruse responses from them according to what al-Khatib related with his chain of transmission to al-Harbi on his authority. He [also] accompanied many of the jurists of Iraq, and sat with Shafi‘i during his second visit to Baghdad after the demise of Muhammad ibn al-Hasan. So he acquired an ample portion of fiqh. Despite all of this, his greater focus and the focus of his disciples was upon the narration of hadith. [In this regard]

He did not follow the methodology of the jurists in the matters of fiqh [al-tafri’], designating its sources, and elucidating the points of legality of judgments and assigning them [totheir particular places] to the point that it was rare that he had a unique view and differed from those fuqaha who came before him in a particular ruling of fiqh ( fi al-furu‘ ). So if he differed with Shafi‘i for example in anything from his new school you would see him agreeing with Abu Hanifa or one of his disciples or Malik,may God be pleased with them.

So the authors of the books of comparative fiqh found it negligible to mention the views of Ahmad by simply mentioning the variance of the jurists who came before him. Then, I forgave them, since we [H .anbalis] do not have a single commentary on fiqh,so, I wrote a commentary for them.”

[In spite of AbuYa‘la’s attempts] in his commentary, he neither clarified what was sahih (rigorously authenticated) nor did he express contention with the rejected [sayings]. He also mentioned some irregular analogies, and I witnessed one of our companions delivering a lesson while taking recourse to the commentaries of Istilam, As‘ad, ‘Amili, and Sharif while borrowing things from them [in spite of being unreliable sources]. So, I composed some commentaries for them such as: Kitab al-Insaf fi masa‘il alKhilaf (“Impartiality About Matters of Disagreement”); Jannat al-Nazar wa Junnat al-Fatr (“Garden of Contemplation and Armor Against Fissure”) and
‘Umda al-Dala‘il fi Mashhur al-Masa‘il (“Reliance of All Proofs Regardingthe Popular View of All Issues”).Then I deemed it appropriate to gather the hadiths of the commentary (of Qadi AbuYa‘la) by which the advocates of the different madhhabs present as proof, and I clarified the basis for that which is sound and the point of contention in that which has been contested. I then composed a book about the [H .anbali] madhhab that incorporated these hadiths, calling it al-Baz al-Ashhab al-Munqadd ‘ala Mukhalifi al-Madhhab (“The Flaming Falcon Swooping Down on the
Dissenters of the [H .anbali] School”). In the science of the branches of fiqh, The recording of his views alongside the views of the other jurists in the books of comparative fiqh did not become widespread until the time of Ibn Hubayra al-Wazir.When he published his Ifsah and specified a sizable volume amongst its volumes to the variance of the four Imams, he gave it complete attention, and strove to spread it by spending enormous sums, [so much so, that] those who wrote in the area of comparative fiqh began to mention the views of Ahmad alongside the views of the other Imams. Ibn Jarir reached him in age and met his disciples, and despite that he did not mention his views in what he wrote regarding the variance of the jurists while mentioning those who were of the likes of Abu Bakr ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Kisan Asamm. So the H .anbalis asked him about that, and he said the like of which is: “Ahmad was not one of the jurists. Rather he was from the people of hadith.And since I did not meet him, I could not learn from him nor have I met any of his disciples who were worthy of learning anything from.” So the agitation of the Hanbalis was incited against him.Then what Yaqut mentions in Mu‘jam al-Udaba and Ibn Kathir mentions in his Kamil occurred [about that incident].

Translator:A proper legal analogy cannot be applied if the reason justifying the ruling or point of legality is undiscerned.Amongst the conditions for determining the proper point of legality, is for the designated point of legality to be a description that is consistent throughout and suitable as a justification for the ruling being applied.When it happens that the determined point of legality is a description that is consistent throughout in all that it is being applied to, but is not suitable as a justification for the ruling—like saying that the reason that wine is forbidden is because it is wine, such a legal analogy is said to be irregular.

I wrote Kitab al-Mudhhib fi al-Madhhab (“The Gilder Regarding the Madhhab”), Masbuk al-Dhahab (“Moulded Gold”) and al-Bulgha (“The Means of Subsistence”). In the fundamentals of the religion, I wrote Minhaj al-Wusul ila ‘ilm al-Usul (“The Way of Reaching Knowledge of the Religious Fundamentals”). In total, so far I have written some 250 works.

I have observed that some of our companions have written about matters of creed in a way that is not proper.There are three in particular:Abu ‘Abd Allah ibn Hamid, his disciple, Qadi AbuYa‘la, 4 and Ibn al-Zaghuni who composed books by which they have disgraced the madhhab.They held the attributes of God to be subject to human understanding and perception.

They heard that God, Glorified and Exalted be He, created Adam on his image, upon him be blessing and peace.On that basis, they acknowledged for Him an image and a physical form, a face attributable to His essence, two eyes, a mouth, uvulas,molar teeth, and lights for His face which represent His majestic splendor, two hands, fingers, a palm, a little [pinky] finger, a thumb, a chest, a thigh, two shins, and two feet.

[They even went so far as saying]:
“We have not heard any mention of the head.” They [then] said:“It is possible for Him to touch and to be touched, and to bring the slave close to His being.” One of them said: “[...] He breathes.”Then they calm the common people by saying:“[These attributes] are not taken as commonly understood.” He is the Shaykh of the Hanbalis, Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Hasan ibn Hamid ibn ‘Ali al-Baghdadi al-Warraq who died in the year 403.He was one of their greatest authors.His Sharh Usul al-Din contains serious errors some of which the author will mention.QadiAbu Ya‘la was trained by him. He is Qadi Abu Ya‘la Muhammad ibn al-Husayn ibn Muhammad ibn Khalf ibn alFarra al-Hanbali who died in the year 458.

According to Ibn al-Athir and Abu al-Fida, they reported that Abu Muhammad al-Tamimi said concerning him “AbuYa‘la has severely disgraced the madhhab. The waters of the oceans cannot wash it away.” In his Tabaqat,Qadi AbuYa‘la attributed to Imam Ahmad unspeakable things, far from being true. Ibn Badran Dushti reported in the section of “Comfirming the Limit” from Kitab al-Usul of AbuYa‘la what is more horrid than what the author will report about him in “al-Tashbih” along with a clash occurring between exoneration and anthropomorphism in his statements. It is no secret to the observer that he is not the AbuYa‘la Ahmad ibn ‘Ali al-Mawsili, the author of al-Musnad, and narrator of the books of AbuYusuf from Bishr ibn al-Walid. He is Abu al-Hasan ‘Ali ibn ‘Ubayd Allah ibn Nasr Zaghuni al-Hanbali who died in the year 527.He is one of the shaykhs of the author. In his Kitab al-Idah he has some striking points of anthropomorphism that will dumbfound the astute person.

Translator:This hadith will be discussed in greater detail later on. It would suffice to say here that the word “his” in the hadith “Verily God created Adam in his image” is unclear. If it is a reference to God—it would mean “God’s image,” and if it was in reference to Adam—it would be Adam’s image.This hadith is considered mutashabih.The traditional view is that “his” is in reference to Adam, upon whom be peace.

They adopted the literal meanings of the names and ascriptions and called them attributes—an invented designation, of which they have no evidence, neither from transmitted knowledge of the text, nor reason.They did not carefully consider those texts that divert one’s attention from adopting the literal meanings [of such expressions] to adopting those meanings that must necessarily apply to God, just as [they did not carefully consider] to negate the meanings implied by those literal expressions that are characteristics of finite beings. They were not satisfied with saying,“[It is] an attribute of action” until they said,“[It is] an attribute of the [Divine] essence [of God].” Once they determined those [words] to be attributes, they said,“We do not understand them according to the usages they imply according to language” like hand for ‘blessing’ and ‘power’ and coming/arriving to mean ‘goodness’ and ‘kindness,’ nor shin to mean ‘severity.’” “Rather,” they said, “We hold and understand them according to their well-acknowledged literal meanings,”while the apparent and literal meaning is what is familiar of human characteristics.

But any text [of the Qur’an and Sunna] is only held according to its literal meaning when it is possible and feasible. If something would redirect or negate this being done, it is understood and held according to its figurative understanding. They then become offended when they are accused of likening God to His creation and show harshness towards anyone who says this to them, while in the same breath, insisting,“We are Ahl al-Sunna,” (Upholders of the Prophetic Tradition) although in their statements they are clearly likening God to His creation.

There are some common people that have begun to follow them and I have advised them by saying,“Companions! Brothers! You are the People who adhere to the texts and follow them.This was the example of your Imam, the Greatest Imam,Ahmad ibn Hanbal, may God, Exalted be He, have mercy on him, who under pain of torture, proclaimed, ‘How can I say what has not been said before?’”

So, take care not to introduce into Khallal mentioned in his book al-Sunna with his chain of narration to Hanbal on the authority of his paternal uncle, Imam Ahmad, that when Imam Ahmad was questioned about the hadiths of the descent, the seeing, the placing of the foot and the like, he said concerning them that,“We believe in them, we declare them to be true, without how and [without] a meaning.” When asked about the establishment, he also said, “He became established on the Throne how He pleased and as He pleased without [having] limitation or a description that could be understood.”This is consignment [of its meaning to God] and exoneration as is the approach of the Salaf. Sometimes Imam Ahmad would use ta‘wil (figurative interpretation) in some places as Hanbal also narrated on the authority of Imam Ahmad that he his madhhab what does not belong in it.Then, you [three] said about the
hadiths [of attributes] “We hold them and understand them according to
their apparent meanings,” while the apparent meaning of [this word] ‘the
foot’ would be the human limb.This is the same thing as what is said and
believed by the Christians,may God,Exalted be He, distance them from His
mercy [for saying such], about Jesus, upon him be blessing and peace.They
understand that he is “God’s spirit” and that God, Sanctified and Exalted in
Highness, has an attribute known as a spirit that entered into Mary.
Whoever says, “He became established with His Divine essence” has
made Him, Sanctified and Exalted is He, subject to reality, as we under-
stand it. It should not be neglected by anyone that the principle by which
the faith is established is reason, and it is by way of this [reason] that we
came to know and hold God to be Eternal without beginning. If only you
had said,“We read the hadiths, and [then] keep silent,” then no one would
have objected to [what] you [do]! [But you refuse to abstain from holding
the texts and understanding them according to the apparent meaning] and this behavior is absolutely disgusting and repugnant. So, do not heard him say, “They made an argument against me on the day of the debate [during his famous inquisition by the rulers of his time].They said: ‘Surat al-Baqara will come on the Day of Resurrection and Surat Tabarak will come.’ Imam Ahmad said:

“So I said to them:
‘It is merely the reward. God, Splendid is His mention, said: And your Lord comes with the angels rank upon rank (Qur’an 89:22) and this means that His power will come.” Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri said in his Fasl,“It has been related to us about Ahmad ibn Hanbal,may God show him mercy, that he said concerning:And your Lord comes; Its meaning is:‘And the command of your Lord comes.’” This [here] is figurative interpretation and exoneration as is the approach of the generations directly after the Salaf. As for what has been reported about Imam Ahmad that contradicts what has preceded, it is a fabrication of an ignorant friend and a faulty understanding of the view of Imam Ahmad.

This is due to the fact that “establishment” for humans is always understood in the sense of sitting.Those who would say that God, literally in His essence, is on the Throne would therefore be affirming that God is held, carried, borne and sitting or some other human act.

Translator: Here he is making a reference to the rule determined by the scholars of Usul al-Din which says, “Reason is a root for revealed knowledge. So raising contention with reason would be to raise contention with revealed knowledge.And contention with the root to correct the branch necessitates contention with both of them together.”

Friday 26 June 2015

Al-Ghazālī, Causality, and Knowledge

Al-Ghazālī, Causality, and Knowledge

Peter Adamson
University of Notre Dame

ABSTRACT: Few passages in Arabic philosophy have attracted as much attention as al-Ghazālī’s discussion of causality in the seventeenth discussion of Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, along with the response of Ibn Rushd (Averroës) in his Tahāfut al-Tahāfut. A question often asked is to what extent al-Ghazālī can be called an occasionalist; that is, whether he follows other Kalām thinkers in restricting causal agency to God alone. What has not been thoroughly addressed in previous studies is a question which al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd both see as decisive in the seventeenth discussion: what theory of causality is sufficient to explain human knowledge? In this paper I show that al-Ghazālī’s and Ibn Rushd’s theories of causality are closely related to their epistemologies. The difference between the two thinkers can be briefly summarized as follows. For Ibn Rushd, the paradigm of human knowledge is demonstrative science; for al-Ghazālī, in contrast, the paradigm of human knowledge is (or at least includes) revelation. Yet both remain committed to the possibility of Aristotelian science and its underlying principles. Thus, I suggest that al-Ghazālī’s stance in the seventeenth discussion sheds light on his critique of philosophy in the Tahāfut: namely, philosophy is not inherently incoherent, but simply limited in scope. I also briefly compare this position to that of Thomas Aquinas, in order to place the view in a more familiar context.

Few passages in Arabic philosophy have attracted as much attention as al-Ghazālī’s discussion of causality in the seventeenth discussion of Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, along with the response of Ibn Rushd (Averroës) in his Tahāfut al-Tahāfut. A question which has been addressed several times is to what extent al-Ghazālī can be called an occasionalist: whether he here follows other Kalām thinkers in restricting causal agency to God alone.[1] What has not been addressed in studies of this text is a question which al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd both see as decisive in the seventeenth discussion: what theory of causality is sufficient to explain human knowledge?[2] In this paper I will show that al-Ghazālī’s and Ibn Rushd’s theories of causality are closely related to their epistemologies. The difference between the two thinkers can be quickly summed up by saying that for Ibn Rushd the paradigm of human knowledge is demonstrative science, whereas for al-Ghazālī the paradigm of human knowledge is, or at least includes, revelation. In closing I will suggest that al-Ghazālī’s commitment to this paradigm sheds light on the guiding intent of his critique of philosophy in the Tahāfut.

But before turning to the epistemic aspect of the seventeenth discussion, let me say briefly what I take to be al-Ghazālī’s basic position on causality. As others have noted, his critique here imputes a very strong notion of causality to the philosophers: namely that given the existence of a cause, the existence of its effect is necessary.[3] Al-Ghazālī holds that, on such a notion of causality, only God is a cause. This is because, given the existence of miracles, and accepting the proposition that God can do anything, no cause other than God can necessitate its effect. It is always possible that God might will the expected effect not to proceed, or will an entirely different effect to proceed. Al-Ghazālī defends this view against both philosophers who claim that a natural cause, such as the fire which causes the burning of cotton, is the sole and sufficient cause for its effect, and against those who, like Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), would say that there is a giver of forms in the celestial world which imposes form once a sublunar cause has prepared some matter for that form. Against the first view, al-Ghazālī gives the famous argument which has been compared to Hume’s: observation of simultaneity does not prove that causation has occurred. Against the latter view, al-Ghazālī says that if effects are brought about by higher principles, they depend ultimately on God’s will, and God can do anything except the absolutely impossible. Therefore, no effect proceeds necessarily from its cause, unless the cause in question is God Himself.

But al-Ghazālī goes on to say, in essence, that natural causes can be regarded as causes if we invoke a weaker notion of causality. He admits that a natural cause has a nature which gives rise to certain effects: fire, for instance, has a nature such that it burns whatever is in contact with it. But this does not mean that fire is a necessary cause, in the sense that the existence of fire in contact with cotton logically entails the existence of burning cotton. The nature of fire itself, says al-Ghazālī, derives from God, and God chooses whether or not this nature will give rise to its normal effect or not. On al-Ghazālī’s view, natural causes are only contingently causes — their effects only proceed if the true Agent who gave them their natures wishes it.[4] Ibn Rushd was the first of many to see this position as an inconsistent concession to the philosophers on al-Ghazālī’s part, because al-Ghazālī seems at first to say that God is the only cause, and then asserts that created things do have natures which lead them to cause their effects. But al-Ghazālī’s view is not inconsistent: it merely sees created natures as inherently contingent and provisional, relying on God’s continued will for their efficacy and very existence.

Ibn Rushd’s response to al-Ghazālī is based on the objection that if any form of occasionalism is accepted, there is no possibility for human knowledge. He remarks that if what he perceives to be al-Ghazālī’s denial of causality is accepted, ‘there is no fixed (thābit) knowledge of anything,’ because ‘certain (yaqīnī) knowledge is the knowledge of the thing according to what it is in itself.’[5] Here Ibn Rushd is tacitly relying on two principles of Aristotelianism. The first is what we might call epistemic optimism: as an Aristotelian, Ibn Rushd takes it for granted that humans have knowledge, so that if a theory of causality is incompatible with our knowing things as they are, then this is itself a sufficient refutation of that theory. The second is the principle that things are only known demonstratively through their causes. This is of course a basic tenet of medieval epistemology: elsewhere in Arabic philosophy, it is used to argue for the impossibility of positive theology in the Liber de Causis, and it is the basis for St. Thomas Aquinas’ notion of a propter quid demonstration.[6] For Ibn Rushd these two principles are the guidelines along which a theory of causality must be developed. He says, for instance, that ‘if the things whose causes are not perceived are unknown by nature and sought after, then what is not unknown necessarily has perceived causes.’[7] On the strength of the two principles, he is confident that he can rule out any form of occasionalism.

The first thing that should be noted about Ibn Rushd’s objection to al-Ghazālī here is that it does not seem, at first, to be relevant. The objection assumes that al-Ghazālī rejects the idea that things have natures, which are both the principles of demonstrative knowledge and the principles of causality. By denying causality, Ibn Rushd argues, al-Ghazālī has also rejected the possibility of knowledge. But as we saw above, al-Ghazālī does not in fact completely reject natures: he thinks a created thing has a created nature which causes a proper effect, but that this nature and causation are always subject to God’s will. Still, one can readily see how Ibn Rushd’s objection might be adapted to meet this rather less occasionalistic view. If natures only possibly give rise to their effects, then our knowledge of them is not necessary, but only probable: natures must remain always the same if they are to be the objects of demonstrative, scientific knowledge.[8] Ibn Rushd alludes to this requirement when he remarks that knowledge based on natures must be ‘fixed’ — in other words, it must always be the case that natures cause a proper effect, by the very definition of ‘nature.’[9] This is one reason why Ibn Rushd insists that miracles, i.e. those cases in which God does step in and disturb the natural course of causation, are not even something we can rationally discuss. Supernatural events, as the very name implies, are beyond any knowledge we can have of nature, and therefore are not properly to be included in any discussion of causality or philosophy in general.

It is a measure of how inapt is the comparison so often made between al-Ghazālī and Hume that al-Ghazālī both anticipates this objection and takes it seriously. His goal is certainly not a kind of Humean skepticism; on the contrary, he is just as committed as Ibn Rushd to Aristotelian epistemic optimism, and in a sense he is even committed to the principle that knowledge is only through causes. Thus al-Ghazālī himself raises the question of why miracles do not prevent our knowledge of the empirical world, admitting that if they did, a man who left a book in his home would have to say,

‘I do not know what is in the house now, and the extent of what I know is only that I left a book in the house, and perhaps now it is a horse.’[10]

Al-Ghazālī’s response to the objection is most intriguing: he suggests that God continually creates in us the knowledge that He will not perform these miracles. Thus the source of a man’s knowledge that, say, his book is still in the house, is God Himself. Indeed, al-Ghazālī seems to be contrasting the so-called ‘knowledge’ of experience, which only leads to the habit of expecting given natures to cause given effects, with a certain knowledge created in us by God. It should be noted here that it has been questioned whether this passage represents al-Ghazālī’s own views — the dispute turns on a point of translation.[11] We need not, however, decide this question here, because even outside this passage al-Ghazālī continues to propose that knowledge can be created in us by God, both in the seventeenth discussion and elsewhere.[12]

A modern reader is likely, I think, to reject al-Ghazālī’s solution as inadequate: a knowledge created by God in a human hardly seems to qualify as knowledge in the proper sense at all. This is in fact exactly the objection put by Ibn Rushd, who argues that one only has knowledge if that knowledge has a direct relationship to the natural cause that is known. Even assuming that God does create knowledge in a person, that person is only said to know if the knowledge ‘is something dependent on the nature of the existent, because the true is [when] one believes something to be as it is in existence.’[13] Thus our two authors are, at root, at odds with one another over the epistemic question: what are the conditions for certain knowledge? For al-Ghazālī, the habit of knowing brought about by experience is not knowledge of what is necessary; only a knowledge produced by God is certain. For Ibn Rushd, the situation is precisely reversed: if God creates a knowledge in us, that knowledge is properly designated as knowledge only if it corresponds to a real nature.

Modern intuitions about this question notwithstanding, it must be admitted that al-Ghazālī’s view on justification is perfectly consistent with his view on causality. Al-Ghazālī admits that we do know that certain things will and will not happen. But if causes are always contingent on God’s will in producing their effects, then certain knowledge can only derive from the real source of necessity in the causal relationship, namely God. Thus, as already remarked, there is a sense in which al-Ghazālī would agree to the second Aristotelian principle that knowledge is always through causes. But for him this means that certain knowledge is always through God, because causality is only through God. That this is really al-Ghazālī’s intent can be seen from the fact that he puts knowledge of normal events on the same plane as the special knowledge that is enjoyed by prophets. The knowledge that comes about through the habitual course of nature is just as certain as the knowledge of a prophet that there will be an exception in the course of nature, because both sorts of knowledge are created by God.[14] Thus it makes sense to say that, for al-Ghazālī, revelation or prophesy is the paradigmatic form of knowledge for humans.

In the face of this view, Ibn Rushd’s insistence on the Aristotelian definition of knowledge as perception in conformity with a nature seems to be little more than begging the question. This is because, as already mentioned, Ibn Rushd assumes that the supernatural — which for al-Ghazālī is fundamental — is a subject which cannot be understood nor even rationally discussed. Indeed, he chastises al-Ghazālī repeatedly for bringing into the arguments of the Tahāfut things that should not be disputed, lest the political function of religion be compromised. In the seventeenth discussion, Ibn Rushd’s political argument against al-Ghazālī is buttressed by an epistemological one: knowledge as such has to do with natures, and therefore excludes supernatural causes and events. Whether Ibn Rushd believes that miracles really do happen, or are only said to happen for the sake of common believers, they will by definition not fall within the realm of scientific, Aristotelian discourse: ‘it is necessary to say about [the shari’a] that its principles are divine matters transcending human intellects, and they must be recognized without fail despite ignorance of their causes.’[15] By itself, this assertion is question-begging because it does not address possible counter-examples to the ‘philosophical’ paradigm of knowledge — such as miracles — assuming in effect that ‘cause’ and ‘knowledge’ are simply terms which do not apply to the supernatural.

Ibn Rushd does, however, have a more elaborate response to give against the accusation of question-begging, because of his own account of the importance of God for natural causes. The regularity and predictability of natural causes, according to Ibn Rushd, is a testament to God’s wisdom. Ibn Rushd can gain support for this view from the Qurān, which he quotes explicitly: ‘And you will not find any alteration in the doings (sunna) of God, and you will not find any change in the doings of God.’[16] Scientific knowledge is not, then, an affront to God’s power, but is only made possible by God’s wisdom, which does not allow natures and therefore causal relationships to change. The defense is deepened by Ibn Rushd’s allusion to another doctrine he holds in the Tahāfut, namely that God’s knowledge of things is the cause of their existence. Ibn Rushd goes so far as to remark that God’s knowledge of natures must have the same objects as our own, though in God’s case the relationship is causal, as well as epistemic: ‘if we have knowledge of these possibles, then there is a condition (hāl) in the possible existents to which our knowledge pertains… and this is what the philosophers designate as nature. Likewise, the knowledge of God is through the existents, although [God’s knowledge] is their cause… and therefore it is necessary that the existents come about in accordance with His knowledge.’[17] But the rejoinder open to al-Ghazālī is clear: Ibn Rushd has here effectively raised scientific knowledge to the level of divine knowledge; indeed, he has identified the two. Thus it also becomes clear how much the paradigm of knowledge, for Ibn Rushd, is that of natural science. But against al-Ghazālī, the view remains question-begging. This is because Ibn Rushd assumes, rather than argues, that divine wisdom and knowledge would be incompatible with a change in the course of nature, whereas al-Ghazālī insists precisely that such changes are possible.

Yet, does not Ibn Rushd have a legitimate criticism of al-Ghazālī insofar as al-Ghazālī’s stance does not allow for scientific knowledge at all? If al-Ghazālī holds to some kind of epistemic optimism regarding natural science, this should remain a problem for him. The answer to this question sheds light on al-Ghazālī’s general attitude towards philosophy in the Tahāfut. Recall that al-Ghazālī does, in fact, concede to the philosophers that there are natures which give rise to effects. So he leaves room for scientific knowledge of those natures (e.g. the knowledge that fire burns). What al-Ghazālī denies is that such knowledge constitutes necessary knowledge — scientific discourse is partial, because it cannot establish whether a given natural cause will be superseded by supernatural intervention. Thus al-Ghazālī does not reject scientific or philosophical knowledge altogether. What he does do is to show that it does not measure up to the rather high standard the philosophers have set for themselves, namely that knowledge be of relationships which are logically necessary.

This is, I would submit, representative of al-Ghazālī’s strategy in the Tahāfut. His goal is not to show the ‘incoherence’ of the philosophers, if this is taken to mean that all of philosophy is incoherent. His goal is rather to show that philosophy must be subsumed within an intellectual enterprise which includes revelation — and further, that revelation must be regarded as the most superior kind of knowledge. The strategy of the Tahāfut is to show that philosophy, mostly as represented by Ibn Sīnā, has overreached itself in a number of cases, reaching false conclusions where reason should simply be recognized as inadequate. Thus in the seventeenth discussion he remarks, regarding prophetic miracles, that ‘although the extent of [the prophet’s] power is not determined in the intellect, there is still no need to deny what is traditionally handed down and what revelation mentions.’[18] Similarly, in the second discussion, taking an approach like that of Maimonides, al-Ghazālī argues, ‘since it is clear that we do not at all dismiss the permanence of the world from the viewpoint of the intellect, but allow as possible the permanence and extinction [of the world], we only know which possibility is really the case through revelation; thus insight into this does not belong to reason.’[19]
Although al-Ghazālī has traditionally been seen as an anti-rationalist, a mere opponent of philosophy, our analysis of the seventeenth discussion suggests that his attitude towards philosophy is both more subtle and less radical. The al-Ghazālī of the Tahāfut should be classed not with the anti-rationalists, but with those concerned to keep philosophy in its proper place. For an analogous position in medieval Europe, we need look no further than St. Thomas Aquinas. Though Aquinas is usually considered to be far more of a rationalist than al-Ghazālī, a Ghazālīan strategy of limiting the claims of philosophy can be found in, for example, Question 12 of the Prima Pars, where Aquinas argues that human reason by itself is unable to know God, so that humans require the supernatural assistance of grace to achieve their perfection. This is not to suggest that Aquinas’ view on the more specific issue of causality is comparable to al-Ghazālī’s. Rather, it is to suggest that, like Thomas, al-Ghazālī can be seen as sympathetic to philosophy within its proper limits, even though he holds that philosophy is not the highest paradigm of human knowledge.

Notes:
I have taken the liberty to rest this paper in the present form with footnotes in lieu of endnotes, and corrections of minor typographical errors. (Muhammad Hozien)
Source: 20 World Congress on Philosophy

[1] An argument against the occasionalist reading of al-Ghazālī is mounted in L.E. Goodman, “Did al-Ghazālī Deny Causality?,” Studia Islamica 47 (1978), pp. 83-120. A more occasionalist reading is given in Binyamin Abrahamov, “Al-Ghazālī’s Theory of Causality,” Studia Islamica 67 (1988), pp. 75-98, which also takes account of al-Ghazālī’s writings outside the Tahāfut. Ilai Alon, “Al-Ghazālī on Causality,” American Oriental Society Journal 100 (1980), pp. 397-405, argues that al-Ghazālī is trying to compromise between the theological and philosophical views. Another discussion can be found in Stephen Riker, “Al-Ghazālī on Necessary Causality,” The Monist 79 (1996), pp. 315-324.
[2] The only treatment of this issue I have found is Michael Marmura, “Ghazali and Demonstrative Science,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 3 (1965), pp. 183-204. Marmura raises some of the same topics I treat here, notably the tension between knowledge and occasionalism and the importance of the creation of knowledge by God. Marmura’s reading of al-Ghazālī is, however, more occasionalist than my own, so that we reach different conclusions about al-Ghazālī’s epistemology.
[3] See Goodman, pp. 84-5.
[4] Al-Ghazālī’s view is reminiscent of the one outlined by al-Kindī in his short treatise On the True Agent, in Al-Kindī, fī al-Falsafa al-Ûlā, in Risā’il al-Kindī al-Falsafiyya, ed. Abû Rīda (Cairo 1950), vol. 1, pp. 182-4, English translation in A. Altmann and S.M. Stern, Isaac Israeli (Westport, 1979), p. 68-9. In this treatise al-Kindī argues that though God is the true Agent, His effects are agents in a secondary, metaphorical sense, through their dependence on Him.
[5] Tahāfut al-Tahāfut li-Ibn Rushd, ed. Muhammad al-’Arīn, Dār al-Fikhr al-Lunbānī (Bairût, 1993), p. 296. (Hereafter Tahāfut.) English translation: Averroes’ Tahāfut Al-Tahāfut, trans. Simon Van Den Burgh, EJW Gibb Memorial Trust (Cambridge, 1954), p. 325. I read yaqīnī with Bouyges and al-’Arīn, rejecting Van Den Burgh’s reading of haqīqī (‘true’). In the notes to his translation, Van Den Burgh comments that he takes this to be an adequate refutation of al-Ghazālī (Van Den Burgh, vol. 2, p. 177). All translations in the paper are my own, though I have consulted Van Den Burgh’s translation and given page citations to it in the footnotes.
[6] Liber de Causis, Prop. 5: ‘And each thing is only known and described from its cause. And when the thing is only a cause and not an effect, it is not known by a prior cause, and is not described because it is higher than description, and speech does not reach it.’ (I translate from the Arabic.)
[7] Tahāfut, pp. 290-1. English translation p. 318.
[8] A similar point is made by Marmura, p. 200.
[9] Of course, this does not rule out that something else may impede a cause from bringing about its effect, as in the case where something is in contact fire but does not burn because it is covered with talc. Ibn Rushd addresses this point, remarking that the causation may be hindered (and is in this sense not necessary), but this does not mean fire has lost its ‘name and measure (hadd),’ i.e. the nature which makes it cause burning. (Tahāfut, p. 291. English translation p. 319.)
[10] Tahāfut, p.295. English translation p. 324.
[11] Goodman (p. 105) points out that the Van Den Burgh translation omits the words ‘fa laysa fī hādhāl-kalām illā tashnī’ mahd’ meaning ‘and in this statement is nothing but outright vilification.’ Goodman would translate the last two words as ‘…pure absurdity,’ so that al-Ghazālī would be calling the theologians’ position absurd. Marmura, defending a more occasionalist reading of al-Ghazālī, translates the same as ‘sheer vilification,’ referring to the philosophers. Marmura’s is clearly the better translation (tashnī’ being the verbal noun of ‘to vilify’), indicating that al-Ghazālī is in fact referring back to the criticism made by the philosophers. The passage is at Tahāfut, p. 296. See also Riker, p. 319.
[12] Tahāfut, p. 300, p. 258. English translation p. 330, p. 278.
[13] Tahāfut, p. 296. English translation, p. 325.
[14] Tahāfut, pp. 295-6. English translation, p. 324.
[15] Tahāfut, p. 294. English translation, p. 322.
[16] Qurān 35.43, cited at Tahāfut, p. 292. English translation, p. 320. See also Tahāfut, p. 302, English translation, p. 333.
[17] Tahāfut, p. 296. English translation, p. 325.
[18] Tahāfut, p. 298. English translation, p. 327.
[19] Tahāfut, p. 84. English translation, p. 70.

Thursday 25 June 2015

Did al-Ghazali Kill the Science in Islam?

Issue 87 / May - June 2012

Did al-Ghazali Kill the Science in Islam?
Nuh Aydin

It is a widespread belief among orientalists that one of the major factors, if not the single most important reason, for the decline of science in the Islamic world after its golden age is al-Ghazali's (1058-1111) attack on philosophers that was culminated in his famous book Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of Philosophers). Critics of al-Ghazali argue that he challenged philosophers on the grounds that the philosophers could not lay down rational explanations for metaphysical arguments. And this challenge, in a way, stopped critical thinking in the Islamic world.

However, a recent book, Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, by George Saliba calls these arguments into question. This book prompted me to think more critically about this long, accepted argument. Can this prominent scholar of Islam or his famous book, Tahafut al-Falasifah, be held responsible, single handedly, for causing an age of decline in the scientific activities in the Muslim World?

Many orientalists argue that Ghazali's Tahafut is responsible for the age of decline in science in the Muslim World. This is their key thesis as they attempt to explain the scientific and intellectual history of the Islamic world. It seems to be the most widely accepted view on the matter not only in the Western world but in the Muslim world as well.

George Saliba, a Professor of Arabic and Islamic Science at Columbia University who specializes in the development of astronomy within Islamic civilization, calls this view the "classical narrative" (Saliba, 2007). However, interesting discoveries in the second half of the twentieth century by historians of science challenged many of the assertions of this classical narrative. An example of such discoveries is the strong connections between Ibn al-Shatir, a famous Damascene astronomer of the fourteenth century, and the Renaissance astronomer Copernicus (Roberts, 1957). If Ghazali had killed science in Islam in the twelfth century, then al-Shatir's work from the fourteenth century could not have been so influential on Copernicus's work. Saliba challenges almost all of the major tenets of the classical narrative on the basis of (1) a critical examination of historical evidence, some of which is quite recent, and (2) the results of his own long-term research in Islamic astronomy.

Saliba's response to the question
In making his argument, Saliba first notes that most of the orientalists operate under the assumption that there must be a sharp conflict between religion and science. This paradigm is probably based on their European experience. To them, al-Ghazali represents the orthodox tradition in Islam and with Tahafut, written in the late eleventh century (between 1091 and 1095), they assume that orthodox religious thought won a decisive victory over rational, scientific thought. From that point on they assume that science in Islam declined, and the Islamic world did not produce anything significant in terms of scientific advancements.

Saliba argues that both of these assumptions are false. First, the European paradigm of conflict between religion and science does not really apply to the Islamic world. The religion of Islam encourages rational and scientific inquiry. Therefore, Muslims see no insurmountable contradictions between their faith and natural laws. Hence, studying religion and studying natural sciences does not create a conflict for Muslims.

Secondly, many of the scientists in the Islamic world were also religious authorities at the same time. A few examples among such scholars are Ibn al-Nafis, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi ,and Ibn al-Shatir who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and made important contributions to such diverse scientific disciplines as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, physics and philosophy. In fact, these scholars were regarded primarily as religious figures by the general public with side interests in sciences. Early Muslim scholars did not hesitate to acquire scientific knowledge wherever they could find it, whether it be in Indian civilization, in Greek civilization, or in Persian civilization. Not only did they acquire these sciences through translation, but they also critically examined them in a comprehensive way. Making corrections and improvements and even introducing new disciplines, they showed a high degree of ownership and maturity. This led to a remarkable period of creativity and rapid advancements in many scientific disciplines in the Islamic world beginning as early as the eighth century (Saliba, 2007).

Contrary to the classical narrative, scientific advancements in the Islamic world did not stop or even slow down after Ghazali. Saliba gives many examples of sophisticated scientific achievements in the Islamic world well after Ghazali. Based on his life-long research in the area, he concludes that the golden age of Islamic astronomy was in the post-Ghazali period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Discoveries by Western historians of science in the second half of the twentieth century show that there are surprisingly strong connections between Copernicus (sixteenth century) and Muslim astronomers from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Ibn al-Shatir (Roberts, 1957; Saliba, 2007). These discoveries were shocking to many in the scholarly community who did not expect to find any transfer of knowledge from the Islamic civilization to Europe in the post-Ghazali period. Unfortunately, this new information has not been sufficiently digested by today's scholars and does not yet generally appear in secondary sources.

Saliba also provides examples from other disciplines, such as medicine, that show that a high level of scientific production took place in more than one discipline in the Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period. How is it that such important scientific materials could have been overlooked by the experts?

According to Saliba a major reason for modern historians of science to have missed the large amount of scientific production in Islamic world in the post-Ghazali period is the damage caused by the classical narrative. Most historians simply weren't looking for it because the classic narrative stipulated that science in Islam was dead after Ghazali. Even though some new discoveries have been made, there are still many scientific works waiting to be studied from that period. As an example of these omissions, Berggren, the author of Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, says that he used this title for his book as opposed to The History of Mathematics in Medieval Islam simply because "Such a book could not be written yet, for so much material remains unstudied that we do not know enough of the whole story" (Berggren, 1986).

The Content and the Method of the Tahafut
Even though Saliba's arguments and evidence are quite convincing to doubt or reject the common narrative, I wanted to go straight to the source-the Tahafut-and have a closer look to see if it might be a book that can be held responsible for killing the science or scientific thought in Islamic civilization.

In Tahafut, Ghazali refutes twenty philosophical doctrines. Using a scientific, or in this context philosophical, method, he first explains those philosophical doctrines before criticizing them. His explanations were so comprehensive and so clear that he made them accessible to non-philosophers, and thus, his ideas became generally better known in the Islamic world. Next, he gave arguments to refute those doctrines. In doing so, he used the very same logical and philosophical principles and arguments that philosophers used in the first place to support their claims. Ghazali mainly argues that the philosophers who proposed the doctrines that conflict with religious principles failed to provide valid and rigorous proofs for their propositions. Hence, he attacked their methodologies using their own tools and principles.

An important point Ghazali makes in Tahafut is that he has no problems with the philosophers' mathematics, astronomical sciences, or logic. He says (Marmura 2000, p. 11):
Regarding mathematical sciences, there is no sense in denying them or disagreeing with them. For these reduce in the final analysis to arithmetic and geometry. As regards to logical sciences, these are concerned with examining the instrument of thought in intelligible things. There is no significant disagreement encountered in these.

Therefore, it is clear that his views could not be used to justify a position against the study of mathematical sciences.

To give the reader a sense of what kinds of philosophical doctrines the Tahafut is concerned with and aims to refute, a selected few out of the twenty are listed below (Marmura 2000, p. 10, 11). The list shows that the questions discussed in Tahafut concern some of the most fundamental issues in theology, particularly in the Islamic theology.

The first problem: On refuting their doctrine of the world's pre-eternity.
The sixth: On refuting their doctrine denying the divine attributes.
The tenth: On showing that upholding a materialist doctrine and the denial of the Maker is a necessary consequence [of what they hold].
The twentieth: On refuting their denial of bodily resurrection and the accompanying bodily pleasures and pains in paradise and hell.

Concluding Remarks
When I discuss the question given in the title of this article with my colleagues, and I argue that it would be unfair to hold Ghazali or Tahafut responsible for the decline of science in Islam, I sometimes hear the objection that "perhaps the content or the method of Tahafut may not justify this conclusion, but this is not how people understood it." But then, one must consider the evidence given by Saliba that there is a large amount of sophisticated scientific production in the Islamic world well after Ghazali, and there is still much more to be discovered. Considering the content of Tahafut and the scientific advances in post-Ghazali period, I have a hard time convincing myself that the classical narrative is the ultimate truth on the matter. This position is supported by the fact that it is usually not realistic to try to explain most major social and historical transformations in terms of a single person, a book, an event, or the like. According to Saliba, the decline in Islamic science was the result of a combination of many internal and external reasons that took place several centuries after Ghazali.

Finally, one may wonder why this question is important or relevant. After all, these things happened a long time ago, and we have to deal with the current realities. One answer would be that there are many lessons to be learned from the history. And of course if the correct version of the history is not available, conclusions will be flawed. If anybody is interested in reviving science and scientific activities in a society, there is much that can be learned from the early Islamic period when there was a remarkable rapid and widespread rise in science, as well as lessons from the later periods of Islamic history when the Islamic world fell behind in scientific production. Some researchers are beginning to realize how much damage the classical narrative has caused in understanding the general history and the development of the modern science. It is always useful to have a critical mind to question and reevaluate assumptions when they do not conform to the evidence.

References
Berggren, J. L. 1986. Episodes in the Mathematics of Medieval Islam, New York: Springer-Verlag.
Marmura, Michael E. (translator). 2000. Al-Ghazali The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifah) Provo: Brigham Young University Press.
Roberts, Victor . 1957. "The Solar and Lunar Theory of Ibn al-Shatir: A pre-Copernican Copernican Model," Isis 48:428-432.

Saliba, George. 2007. Islamic Science and Making of the European Renaissance, Cambridge: MIT Press.



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Bahasan Tahafut al-Falasifah

Tahafut al-Falasifah dan Kerancuan Filsafat Al-Ghazali (Membongkar Fitnah-Fitnah Teuku Zulkhairi)
19 April 2010 13:16:00 Dibaca : 1
Sebelum terjadi tsunami, Aceh adalah wilayah yang sangat sepi dari debat-debat intelektual. Perkembangan intelektual di Aceh begitu kering dan nyaris tanpa dinamika, kelompok diskusi hampir tidak bisa ditemukan sama sekali.

Tapi pasca tsunami semua berubah total. Aceh yang selama ini oleh pemerintah RI ditutup dengan ketat  dari pengaruh luar, tiba-tiba menjadi terbuka, Aceh tiba-tiba dibanjiri berbagai ide dan gagasan. Sehingga dunia intelektual di Aceh yang sebelumnya statis tanpa perkembangan tiba-tiba berubah menjadi dinamis. Aceh tiba-tiba berubah menjadi kuali besar pertarungan gagasan.

Dulu, sebelum terjadi tsunami,  di Aceh, saya akan terlihat seperti orang aneh jika berbicara tentang masalah-masalah ilmu sosial, semacam psikologi antropologi sampai filsafat. Tapi pasca tsunami, ada banyak sekali pemikiran yang berkembang, mulai yang kekiri-kirian, liberal, moderat sampai yang fundamentalis dan cenderung radikal muncul bersamaan.

Suasana ini benar-benar sangat menggairahkan, apalagi kemudian teknologi informasi yang berkembang begitu pesat dalam tahun-tahun belakangan ini membuat setiap gagasan apapun yang ada di kepala menjadi begitu mudah untuk dilemparkan ke publik untuk kemudian diperdebatkan.

Beberapa bulan yang lalu, saya pernah melemparkan sebuah gagasan di facebook untuk dijadikan bahan diskusi dan perdebatan. Saat itu saya menyinggung tentang sebuah Karya seorang tokoh besar Islam bernama Al-Ghazali yang berjudul Tahafut al-Falasifah (Kerancuan Filsafat) yang dibantah oleh Ibnu Rushd, tokoh besar lain yang lahir sesudah Al-Ghazali tiada. Karya Ibnu Rushd yang merupakan bantahan terhadap karya Al-Ghazali tersebut oleh Ibnu Rushd diberi judul Tahafut Al Tahafut (Kerancuan di atas Kerancuan).

Dalam debat antara kedua tokoh ini, saya dengan tegas memposisikan diri ada di kubu Ibnu Rushd.

Masalahnya, Al-Ghazali adalah tokoh pujaan kaum puritan, sehingga pilihan saya berada di kubu Ibnu Rushd membuat kelompok ini tidak senang. Dan dari semua aliran pemikiran dan gagasan yang muncul di Aceh pasca tsunami, kaum puritan ini adalah yang paling aneh. Jika kelompok lain antusias ketika diajak beradu gagasan, maka kelompok ini tidak. Mereka ingin gagasan apapun yang berkembang di Aceh, harus ada dalam jalur yang telah mereka gariskan secara sepihak.

Begitulah, ketika gagasan ini saya lemparkan, dengan segera saya pun mendapat serangan. Di antara beberapa orang kelompok puritan yang menyerang saya ini ada satu orang yang sangat bersemangat menyerang saya, namanya Teuku Zulkhairi. Tapi sayangnya semangat Teuku Zulkhairi saat menyerang saya ini tidak didukung oleh kecerdasan, wawasan dan penguasaan data yang memadai, sehingga serangannya terhadap saya pun pada akhirnya bukan lagi pada gagasan tapi lebih mengarah kepada pribadi (Ad Hominem), yang dengan hati saya layani sampai membuatnya terkaing-kaing lari.

Pilihan saya mendukung Ibnu Rushd ditambah dengan beberapa debat lain dengan saya yang tidak pernah bisa dia menangkan, membuat Teuku Zulkhairi memaki-maki dan menyebut saya sebagai kaum pengacau keimanan.

Dalam banyak pertemuan dengannya di dunia maya, dia begitu sering mempersalahkan saya saat saya mengkritisi Tahafut al-Falasifah karangan Al-Ghazali, yang selalu saya jawab dengan mempersilahkannnya mengambil argumen dari Tahafut al-Falasifah yang nanti akan saya balas dengan mengambil argumen dari Tahafut Al Tahafut.

Tapi Teuku Zulkhairi terus mengelak dari tantangan saya dengan berbagai alasan yang dibuat-buat, sambil terus melecehkan ucapan saya yang mengatakan akan mengambil argumen dari Tahafut Al Tahafut.

"Kerancuan di atas Kerancuan" yang merupakan terjemahan tulisan Ibnu Rushd ini dalam bahasa Indonesia, terus menerus digunakan oleh Teuku Zulkhairi untuk melecehkan gagasan saya, yang berpuncak pada keluarnya fitnah yang yang dia tulis diam-diam di Kompasiana dengan judul " Membongkar Kerancuan Di Atas Kerancuan Pemikiran Win Wan Nur" yang penuh dengan berbagai fakta yang dia rekayasa untuk menyudutkan saya baca : http://filsafat.kompasiana.com/2010/03/20/membongkar-%E2%80%9Ckerancuan-di-atas-kerancuan%E2%80%9D-pemikiran-win-wan-nur-oleh-teuku-zulkhairibersambung/

Karena itu, supaya masalah ini tidak berlarut-larut karena saya terus menunggu ditanggapinya tantangan saya, kali ini saya memilih untuk langsung menjawab pertanyaan Teuku Zulkhari kepada saya tentang bagaimana sebenarnya pandangan saya pribadi terhadap Al-Ghazali dan Tahafut al-Falasifah karangan tokoh besar Islam ini.

Untuk menjawab pertanyaan Teuku Zulkhairi tentang bagaimana saya menilai Imam Ghazali.

Saya harus terlebih dahulu menjelaskan, kalau soal sosok Al-Ghazali ini, sangatlah tidak mungkin saya membuat sebuah kesimpulan tunggal, karena cara pandang dan pemikiran tokoh ini banyak berevolusi sepanjang masa hidupnya. Dalam menilai ide-ide dalam karya Al-Ghazali, penilaian yang bisa kita lakukan sangat tergantung pada kapan karyanya tersebut dikeluarkan dan sudah sejauh apa evolusi spiritual yang dia alami saat karya itu ditulis. Sebab Abu-Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali yang lahir pada 450 H /1058 M dan wafat pada 505/1111 M ini adalah seorang manusia multi dimensi, dia adalah seorang Asy‘ariah ketika sedang ada bersama kaum Asy‘ariah, dia adalah seorang Sufi ketika bergabung dengan kaum Sufi, dan diapun adalah seorang filsuf ketika berada bersama para filsuf.

Jadi kalau kita ingin menilai pribadi tokoh yang satu ini secara komprehensif, maka akan ada banyak sekali dimensi yang harus disatukan, dan karena alasan inilah saya sama sekali tidak tertarik untuk menjadi seorang penilai terhadap pribadi tokoh besar Islam yang satu ini.

***

Dunia Islam di masa Al-Ghazali hidup, beberapa generasi sebelum kelahirannya dan beberapa generasi sesudah kematiannya adalah dunia intelektual yang penuh dinamika. Ada banyak sekali ragam isu yang diperdebatkan antara sesama cendekia zaman itu. Entah itu ilmu kedokteran, kimia, fisika, matematika, astronomi, psikologi, tasawuf, tauhid dan segala macam ilmu yang kita kenal sekarang.

Tapi dari sekian banyak pemikiran tokoh-tokoh Islam pada masa abad pertengahan ini, terus terang minat terbesar saya lebih banyak tertuju pada bidang filsafat yang mereka kembangkan pada masa itu. Saya menaruh minat besar pada bidang ini  karena dalam pandangan saya, kesalahan pengambilan pilihan pemikiran filsafat untuk dianut oleh umat Islam pada masa inilah yang menjadi kunci penyebab kemunduran peradaban Islam sampai hari ini.

Maka ketika saya berbicara tentang Al-Ghazali, fokus pembicaraan saya adalah pada PEMIKIRANNYA dalam kapasitasnya sebagai FILSUF, bukan pemikiran atau sosoknya sebagai seorang Asy'ariah (meskipun tentu saja akan tetap ada bagian Asy'ariah Ghazali yang akan saya singgung karena pandangan filsafat Al Ghazali memang tidak bisa dilepaskan dari cara pandang khas kaum Asy'ariah) atau sosoknya sebagai seorang Sufi (yang sangat diminati oleh musisi Ahmad Dhani).

Kehadiran Al-Ghazali sebagai FILSUF adalah sebagai antitesis untuk aliran Mu‘tazilah, yang merupakan aliran kritis pertama dalam Islam yang lahir kira-kira pada tahun 723 Masehi (orang-orang penganut paham ini disebut Mutakalimun).

Filsafat kaum Mu'tazillah ini banyak dipengaruhi oleh filsafat yunani kuno dari tokoh-tokoh semacam Plato dan terutama Aristoteles.

Seperti yang saya katakan di atas, Al-Ghazali adalah pengikut  aliran kritis yang lain bernama  Asy‘ariah yang muncul kira-kira satu generasi setelah kemunculan Mu'tazillah. Aliran ini dinamai demikian dengan mengambil nama Al Asy‘ari, tokoh yang lahir pada tahun 873 masehi.

Asy'ariyah ini adalah aliran kritis yang mencoba berada di tengah-tengah antara pandangan tradisional yang yang maunya melarang penggunaan segala hal yang berbau rasional dalam memahami agama (seperti paham Salafi dan wahabi yang marak belakangan ini) dengan pikiran rasional. Aliran Asy'ariah ini terkenal dengan konsepnya yang mengatakan bahwa akal tanpa dibantu dengan wahyu tidak akan bisa menjelaskan kebenaran yang sesungguhnya.

Nah ketika Al-Ghazali menghantam filsafat kaum Mu'tazillah, Al-Ghazali bersandar pada cara pandang kaum Asy'ariyah ini.

Sebagaimana filsafat Mu'tazillah yang banyak bersintesa dengan alam pikiran Yunani, konsep Asy'ariah yang diadopsi oleh Al Ghazali sendiripun sebenarnya tidak bisa melepaskan argumennya dari pengaruh pemikiran para filsuf Yunani dari kelompok Skeptis dan terutama dari aliran filsafat Stoisisme-nya Zeno dari Citium (334-262 SM) [dalam sejarah sekolah filsfat Stoi (baca : STOA) ada dua Zeno, selain Zeno dari Citium ada lagi  Zeno dari Tarsus yang merupakan pemimpin keempat sekolah filsafat Stoi yang hidup sekitar tahun 200 SM] .

Dari aliran filsafat Stoisme ini, aliran Ays'ariyah yang dianut oleh Al-Ghazali mengadopsi epistemologi, sensasionalisme, nominalisme dan materialisme mereka.

Contoh besarnya pengaruh filsafat Stoi dalam cara pandang aliran ini adalah konsep Asy'ariah tentang kehendak Allah.

Dalam Tahafut al-Falasifa, halaman. hal 237, Al-Ghazali mengatakan "Manusia tidak (bisa dikatakan) baik atau jahat karena pembawaan, meskipun pada dasarnya manusia itu lebih cenderung menjadi baik ketimbang menjadi jahat". Ucapan Ghazali ini merujuk pada pandangan Asy'ariah yang mempercayai bahwa benar dan salah adalah urusan manusia yang tidak bisa disangkut pautkan dengan Tuhan.

Pandangan Asy'ariah ini jelas sangat dipengaruhi oleh aliran filsafat Stoisisme (Aliran filsafat yang pada masanya menentang habis ajaran aliran filsafat Epicurus yang menyatakan Hedonisme yang menganggap bahwa kesenangan dan kenikmatan materi adalah tujuan utama hidup).

Apa yang dikatakan oleh Al Ghazali yang didasari oleh konsep Asy'ariah ini kurang lebih sama dengan "Cui mali nihil est nec esse potest quid huic opus est dilectu bonorum et malorum?" yang artinya kurang lebih "Pilihan apa yang bisa membantu seseorang (berbuat jahat) bagi orang yang tidak memiliki sifat jahat dan juga tidak dimiliki (oleh sifat-sifat jahat itu)" yang merupakan argumen Skeptis dari Carneades yang pernah menjadi mahasiswa di sekolah filsafat Stoi, yang belajar logika di bawah bimbingan Diogenes (Kepala sekolaf filsafat Stoi ke-lima yang hidup sekitar tahun 230-150 SM). Perkataan Carneades ini disampaikan oleh  Cicero  dalam De natura deorum, iii. 15. 38.

Beberapa detail epistemologi khas Stoi ini misalnya disampaikan oleh Ghazali dalam Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din Ihya’ dimana Al-Ghazali mengatakan, Jiwa saat lahir adalah putih seperti kertas dan disanalah sifat dicetak (ini yang menjadi dasar konsep tabula rasa) , kemudian  Al-Ghazali juga mengatakan manusia memperoleh akan dan pengetahuan tentang baik dan benar pada umur 7 tahun (ini kemudian menjadi dasar anggapan dan cara pandang terhadap anak-anak selama ini yang belakangan oleh Jean Piaget, Erik H Eriksson dan para psikolog perkembangan lainnya telah dibuktikan salah, karena ternyata bayi sudah punya sifat dan karakter sejak masih di dalam perut)

Belakangan, oleh pengikutnya, apa yang dimaksud oleh Al-Ghazali sebagai Kehendak Allah yang menjadi rahasiaNya yang tidak bisa ditimbang dengan perhitungan-perhitungan yang berdasarkan akal itu juga termasuk hal-hal semacam jenis kelamin bayi di dalam perut, apakah hujan akan turun atau tidak di saat mendung. Konsep tauhid semacam ini yang merupakan warisan pemikiran Al-Ghazali tersebut masih sering diajarkan kepada saya oleh guru-guru ngaji saya semasa kecil di Takengen.

Pandangan Al-Ghazali yang semacam inilah yang ditentang oleh Ibnu Rushd dalam Tahafut Al Tahafut, yang salah satu diantaranya seperti contoh yang saya ambil dari ucapan Ibnu Rushd mengatakan ; Seluruh basis argumen Al-Ghazali salah, karena Al-Ghazali berasumsi bahwa kehendak Allah itu sama seperti kehendak manusia. Padahal Nafsu dan kehendak hanya bisa dimengerti oleh makhluk yang memiliki kebutuhan; Sementara untuk Zat yang Maha Sempurna yang tidak membutuhkan apa-apa, kita tidak memiliki pilihan lain selain mengatakan bahwa ketiak Dia melakukan sesuatu maka yang Dia lakukan itu adalah hal yang paling sempurna. Jadi kehendak Allah harus dipahami dengan makna yang lain dibanding kehendak manusia.

Ketika kemudian ucapan Ibnu Rushd ini saya post di status facebook saya, membuat kaum puritan radikal yang dimotori oleh Teuku Zulkhairi menuduh saya sebagai kaum pengacau keimanan dan berbagai sebutan buruk lainnya.

Jadi ketika Zulkhairi menanyakan bagaimana saya memandang Al-Ghazali, kalau dipandang dari sudut pandang ini, maka saya memandang Al-Ghazali sebagai tokoh yang berperan besar dalam mempertentangkan antara Iman dan Akal. Dan berkat Al-Ghazali, dalam pertarungan ini Iman lah yang menang. Sehingga merusak semua semangat eksplorasi dan penggalian ilmu pengetahuan yang pada masa itu begitu menggairahkan.

Meneruskan apa yang sudah dilakukan oleh gurunya, Ibnu Thufayl dalam novel eksperimental pemikiran Hayy Ibn Yaqzan (dalam novel ini Ibnu Thufayl tampaknya sepakat dengan konsep Ghazali soal tabula rasa), Ibnu Rushd yang hadir belakangan mencoba untuk memperbaiki apa yang telah dirusak oleh Al-Ghazali ini, tapi usahanya tidak berhasil.

Oleh para pengikut Al-Ghazali, Ibnu Rushd malah dicap sesat, dimaki dituduh dan difitnah dengan berbagai dakwaan. Oleh orang-orang ini Ibnu Rushd dituduh sebagai pengacau keimanan dengan menyebarkan ilmu-ilmu Yunani. Rakyat Cordoba yang termakan fitnah kelompok ini mengejek dan menghina Ibnu Rushd dengan berbagai kalimat buruk dan tuduhan yang tidak berdasar.

Pernah satu kali, ketika Ibnu Rushd melaksanakan shalat Ashar bersama sahabatnya, dia diejek dan diusir dari masjid Cordoba. Masyarakat membakar karya-karyanya. Dan pada puncaknya, Khalifah al-Mansur yang menjadi penguasa di Cordoba waktu itu, sepakat dengan tuduhan masyarakat ini dan kemudian menghukum Ibnu Rushd. Sebagai hukuman atas "kesalahannya" Khalifah al-Mansur memerintahkan Ibnu Rushd untuk dibuang ke perkampungan Yahudi "Lucena".

Memang setahun setelah hukuman itu dikeluarkan, para ulama mengadakan protes agar Ibnu Rushd dibebaskan karena diantara kalangan ulama itu banyak yang meyakini kalau Ibnu Rushd tidak bersalah. Tekanan dari ulama yang pro Ibnu Rushd tersebut membuat Khalifah al-Mansur mengeluarkan surat pengampunan terhadap Ibnu Rushd.

Setelah dibebaskan, Ibnu Rushd kembali ke Cordoba dan berkumpul lagi dengan keluarganya dan para sahabatnya. Namun tidak lama kemudian ia wafat pada tahun 1198 Masehi dalam usia 72 tahun.

Sementara itu fitnah yang dilakukan terhadap Ibnu Rushd yang sudah terlanjur menyebar.

Dalam bukunya Mr. Peabody Apple, Madonna penyanyi pop Amerika yang terkenal itu menggambarkan Fitnah itu ibarat sebuah bantal berisi bulu angsa yang di belah di sebuah tanah lapang dalam cuaca berangin.

Oleh Madonna digambarkan, bulu yang sebelumnya terkurung dalam bantal, ketika dibelah, diterbangkan angin ke segala penjuru, tanpa bisa diatur kemana arah terbangnya.  Dan ketika bulu-bulu angsa pengisi bantal tersebut sudah terlanjur diterbangkan angin, bulu-bulu itupun hinggap di mana-mana, bahkan sampai ke tempat-tempat yang tidak diketahui oleh orang yang membelah bantal itu, bulu-bulu yang sudah terbang itu tidak akan pernah bisa lagi dikumpulkan untuk kembali disatukan menjadi sebuah bantal.

Hal seperti yang digambarkan oleh Madonna dalam bukunya itulah yang terjadi pada Ibnu Rushd yang sudah terlanjur dicap sesat oleh orang-orang yang merasa diri beriman. Orang-orang 'beriman' yang sudah termakan fitnah terhadap Ibnu Rushd yang disebarkan oleh orang yang merasa diri PALING BERIMAN tidak bisa lagi satu persatu dikumpulkan untuk diberi penjelasan, tentang duduk perkara yang benar.

Akibatnya, meskipun telah diberi pengampunan, ide dan pemikiran Ibnu Rushd sama sekali tidak bisa lagi diterima oleh sebagian sangat besar kalangan Islam (sampai hari ini). Setelah Ibnu Rushd diampuni dan dibebaskan, kalangan umat Islam tetap lebih suka mempertahankan ide-ide Al-Ghazali yang menyerahkan penjelasan dari hampir semua rahasia alam kepada kebijaksanaan Allah dan mempercayai kalau semua rahasia Allah itu tidak akan bisa dipecahkan oleh Manusia dengan mengandalkan akal.

Jika di kalangan Islam pemikirannya ditolak, sebaliknya, ide dan pemikiran Ibnu Rushd justru diterima dengan luas dan malah kemudian diadopsi oleh kaum Kristen dan Yahudi. Ide-ide dan pemikiran Ibnu Rushd kemudian diteruskan bukan oleh para pemikir dan filsuf Islam, melainkan oleh para pemikir dan filsuf Kristen dan Yahudi.

Di Barat Tahafut al-Tahafut ini telah memengaruhi para filosof  untuk mengkritik doktrin Gereja yang sangat dominan. Dari sinilah filsafat pencerahan itu dimulai.

Memang, kalau materi yang dibahas dalam filsafat Ibnu Rushd yang khas zaman itu yang melulu mengangkat tema-tema metafisika dan ketuhanan dinilai dengan kacamata filsafat modern, materi yang diangkat oleh Ibnu Rushd sekitar lebih dari 800 tahun yang lalu sudah sangat usang dan sudah tidak relevan lagi untuk diperdebatkan karena apa yang dibahas oleh Ibnu Rushd bahkan logika klasik Aristoteles yang begitu dipuja oleh Ibnu Rushd pun sudah banyak dibantah dan ditolak oleh filsafat modern.

Tapi dalam menilai filsafat Ibnu Rushd, materi yang dibahas 800 tahun yang lalu tidaklah terlalu menarik bagi saya, apa yang menarik dari filsafat Ibnu Rushd di mata saya adalah IDE besar dari filsafat yang dikembangkan oleh tokoh yang satu ini, mulai dari rasionalitasnya, penghargaannya yang tinggi terhadap akal dan metode kritisismenya dalam menilai sebuah permasalahan.  IDE BESAR filsafat Ibnu Rushd inilah yang telah menginspirasi para filsuf modern, mulai dari Thomas Aquinas sampai pada Immanuel Kant, filsuf positivis terbesar dengan karya fenomenalnya Critique of Pure Reason yang mengubah cara pandang manusia secara keseluruhan terhadap ilmu pengetahuan.

Voltaire dan Rousseau yang merupakan pelopor era Renaissance di Perancis, gerakan yang berhasil mengubah wajah eropa sehingga mencapai puncak demilang peradaban, bahkan mengatakan kalau mereka bukan hanya sekadar terpengaruh oleh pemikiran filsafat Ibnu Rushd, tapi mereka terang-terangan mengaku mendapat inspirasi setelah membaca karya-karya Ibnu Rushd.

Jadi tidaklah berlebihan kalau kita katakan bahwa pemikiran filsafat Ibnu Rushd inilah sebenarnya menjadi dasar dari kegemilangan peradaban eropa dan barat secara keseluruhan.

Inilah yang disebut ironi, dalam Islam, pemikiran dan ide gemilang Ibnu Rushd ini tidak mendapat tempat, bahkan untuk di Indonesia, kalau kita merujuk pada ucapan Teuku Zulkhairi, pemikiran filsafat seperti ini malah diharamkan oleh MUI.

Begitulah, kalau ada orang yang menanyakan pendapat saya tentang Tahafut al-Falasifah yang merupakan karya besar Al-Ghazali, maka menurut saya buku ini adalah sebuah karya yang hebat yang dibuat oleh Ghazali untuk mempertahankan IMAN terhadap AKAL, yang dibuat oleh Al-Ghazali berdasar kegelisahannya menyaksikan banyaknya pemikiran intelektual Islam masa itu yang beberapa di antaranya sudah terlalu mendewakan akal.

Tapi sayangnya dalam usahanya ini, dalam buku Tahafut al-Falasifah, Al-Ghazali malah menyerang seluruh perilaku orang-orang yang melakukan proses berpikir menggunaan akal dalam menjelaskan segala fenomena alam. Dalam Tahafut al-Falasifah, Al-Ghazali mencela perilaku seperti itu sambil mengajak umat Islam untuk hanya menyerahkan segala permasalahan dan penjelasan terhadap segala fenomena dan rahasia alam semata pada Allah.

Dalam Tahafut al-Falasifah, Al-Ghazali membahas dua puluh masalah. Enam belas masalah metafisik dan empat masalah fisik. Dari dua puluh masalah yang dibahas oleh Al-Ghazali tersebut, tujuh belas diantaranya berisi tuduhan terhadap  para filsuf yang dikatakan oleh Al-Ghazali telah melakukan bid’ah. Semnetara di tiga masalah sisanya, Al-Ghazali dengan yakin mengatakan bahwa para filsuf telah keluar dari Islam, alias KAFIR.

Dalam buku berikutnya dari Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din (yang sedikit potongannya saya kutip di atas), Al-Ghazali mengatakan bahwa hanya ilmu agamalah yang wajib dipelajari secara pribadi (fardlu ‘ain) olah para muslim. Sementara ilmu dunia,hanyalah fardlu kifayah yang kalau sudah ada orang Islam lain yang melakukannya, maka orang Islam sisanya sudah tidak lagi memiliki kewajiban untuk mempelajarinya.

Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din yang merupakan simbol pemikiran tasawuf, yang sesuai dengan namanya menganjurkan umat Islam untuk mendalami ilmu-ilmu agama saja telah menjadi senjata pamungkas yang sukses mematikan pemikiran rasional di dunia Islam. Kemudian, ketika pemikiran tasawuf Al-Ghazali kemudian semakin diperkuat oleh Ibnu ‘Arabi. Sejarah kegemilangan dunia Islam-pun resmi berakhir.

Alasan-alasan seperti inilah yang membuat saya berpandangan, kalau buku Tahafut al-Falasifah memiliki lebih banyak sisi negatif daripada sisi positifnya, sehingga menurut saya, buku ini lebih bersifat merusak daripada membangun, sebab ide-ide dalam buku ini mengajak orang Islam untuk berhenti berpikir, hal yang menurut saya merupakan sumber keterpurukan umat Islam sejak pudarnya pengaruh Mu'tazillah di abad ke-12 M, sampai hari ini dan belum ada tanda-tanda akan bangkit lagi.

Ibarat kisah dalam cerita silat karangan Asmaraman S Kho Ping Hoo, Tahafut al-Falasifah adalah jurus sakti milik umat Islam yang saat dikeluarkan malah berbalik menghantam dan menghancurkan pemilik jurus itu sendiri.

Wassalam

Win Wan Nur

Orang Aceh berdomisili di Jakarta

www.winwannur.blog.com

www.winwannur.blogspot.com

Sumber :

Abu Bakr Ibn Tufail, The History of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, (New York : Frederick A. Stokes Company) “L'atomisme antique face a l'amour,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger (Morana, Cyril, 1996). AL Ghazali/ghaz-mn.htm Tahafut Al-Falasifah (Kerancuan para Filosof) Penulis: Al-Gazali Pengantar: Dr Sulaiman Dunya Penerbit: Marja’ Bandung, Maret 2010 TAHAFUT AL-TAHAFUT The Incoherence of the Incoherence http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/averroes03.htm Mengembalikan Masa Kejayaan Islam http://www.albarokah.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=226&Itemid=2 Carneades http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/carneades/ Epicureanism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicureanism Ash'ariyya and Mu'tazila http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H052 Identitas dan Siklus Hidup Manusia Bunga Rampai I, terjemahan dan pendahuluan oleh Drs. Agus Cremer, Gramedia, Jakarta 1989 Jean Piaget, Antara Tindakan dan Pikiran, Gramedia Jakarta 1989

Win Wan Nur
/winwannur
TERVERIFIKASI (HIJAU)
Saya adalah orang Gayo yang lahir di Takengen 24 Juni 1974. Berlangganan Kompas dan menyukai rubrik OPINI.
Selengkapnya...

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Siapa Yang Menilai Tulisan Ini ? 0BERI NILAI
TOTAL KOMENTAR : 13

Win Wan Nur20 April 2010 06:22:56
@ Mita.... Benar sekali, sayapun mulai berpikir kalau kejayaan Islam masa itu bukan semata karena faham Mu'tazilahnya, tapi lebih kepada dibiarkannya para cendekiawan beradu gagasan dengan terbuka dan dalam spekturm yang sangat luas. Tapi kemunculan Al-Ghazali dengan cara pandang yang mau menang sendiri, menghancurkan semuanya, menutup ruang hidup dan berkembang bagi segala perbedaan ide dan pemikiran.
Balas

Mita Nusa20 April 2010 00:16:42
Sangat lengkap dan runut tentang al Ghazali dan Ibn Rushd. Saya setuju dengan pak Win wan nur. Teori sy faham mu'tazilah yang dianut para filosof/ilmuwan muslim abad ke 9-12 lah yang menyumbang banyak ilmu pd jaman emas islam. Ketika faham ini dilarang dan pintu ijtihad ditutup dimulailah jaman kebodohan islam. Barangkali juga bukan mu'tazilahnya, tapi kondisi yang kondusif dan menggairahkan dari dibolehkan hidupnya berbagai faham dan pemikiranlah yang membuat islam sangat maju pada saat itu.
Balas

Win Wan Nur29 April 2010 22:15:31
Soal "Kebenaran Mutlak" seperti biasa itu adalah tuduhan khas yang berasal dari nanah Fundamentalis yang ada dalam otakmu itu Zul, karena yang merasa mengerti kebenaran mutlak itu ya memang cuma kaum fundamentalis tolol seperti kamu, yang merasa mengerti kebenaran mutlak padahal membaca tulisan seperti ini saja logikanya sudah jungkir balik nggak ketentuan. Orang seperti aku yang selalu menemui hal-hal baru yang mengoreksi kebenaran sebelumnya mana pernah mempercayai sesuatu ide yang keluar dari kepala manusia sebagai kebenaran mutlak. Kamu sendiri sudah jelas akan kelimpungan kalau aku minta untuk menunjukkan di bagian mana tulisan ini yang menyatakan kalau aku menganggap pendapat Ibnu Rushd sebagai kebenaran Mutlak. orang di sini aku jelas-jelas bilang Memang, kalau materi yang dibahas dalam filsafat Ibnu Rushd yang khas zaman itu yang melulu mengangkat tema-tema metafisika dan ketuhanan dinilai dengan kacamata filsafat modern, materi yang diangkat oleh Ibnu Rushd sekitar lebih dari 800 tahun yang lalu sudah sangat usang dan sudah tidak relevan lagi untuk diperdebatkan karena apa yang dibahas oleh Ibnu Rushd bahkan logika klasik Aristoteles yang begitu dipuja oleh Ibnu Rushd pun sudah banyak dibantah dan ditolak oleh filsafat modern. "Tapi dalam menilai filsafat Ibnu Rushd, materi yang dibahas 800 tahun yang lalu tidaklah terlalu menarik bagi saya, apa yang menarik dari filsafat Ibnu Rushd di mata saya adalah IDE besar dari filsafat yang dikembangkan oleh tokoh yang satu ini, mulai dari rasionalitasnya, penghargaannya yang tinggi terhadap akal dan metode kritisismenya dalam menilai sebuah permasalahan."
Balas

Teuku Zulkhairi28 April 2010 21:21:57
Jumlah pembaca hingga saat ini sy pantau ada 142, dengan satu komentar... Mungkin terlalu banyak ngawurnya win.. krn biar bagaimana pun umat Islam lebih melihat sisi positif yg dimili Imam Ghzali, bukan sisi negatifnya... Imam Ghazali sudah berbuat banyak bagi umat Islam... kalo anda Win? kira2 apa aja sumbangsih yg telah bung win berikan? sy pikir dlm konflik antara 2 Imam besar ini, kita lebih baik ditengah aja win, Imam Ghzali hebat, Ibn Rushd juga hebat, sama2 sudah berbuat banyak utk umat Islam... jadi biar umat tdk bingung, langkah yg mungkin dan lebih baik kita lakukan adalah menghimpun berbagai kebaikan dan kebenaran yg berserak itu utk kemudian kita sajikan ke hadapan umat... jadi kita tdk hanya menjadi pengacau, pentaklid buta, tendensius dan egois krn hanya mengggap pendapat Ibn Rushd lah sebagai kebenaran mutlak....padahal kebenaran mutlak hanya milik Allah...
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Edi Safrizal03 Mei 2010 09:38:59
memang di Aceh nggak ada dokter Jiwa ya Bung win?...kok bisa-bisanya orang yang udah jelas-jelas sakit seperti Tengku Zulkhairi ini, bisa bebas berkeliaran dan menyebarkan pemikiran konyol kemana-mana?
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Win Wan Nur29 April 2010 22:11:19
Zul...sekali lagi kamu membuktikan kalau otak di kepalamu itu fungsinya nggak lebih dari sekedar aksesoris. Kualitas sebuah tulisan kok dibandingkan dengan kuantitas pembacanya. Kaslau cara nmengambil kesimpulan seperti punyamu ini dipakai, maka karena Kangen band lebih banyak didengarkan orang otomatis kualitas musiknya lebih bagus dibanding Tompi atau Ran. Karena Empat Matanya Tukul lebih banyak ditonton orang ketimbang Kick ANdy, maka otomatis Tukul lebih cerdas daripada Andy F Noya. di dunia orang yang nggak biasa menggunakan otak seperti kamu, ya cara pengambilan kesimpulan seperti ini ya sah-sah saja, tapi di dunia normal yang beradab, ada orang yang mengambil kesimpulan dengan cara seperti kamu ya jadi bahan tertawaan. Tapi nggak apa-apalah, karena caramu menilai kualitas sebuah tulisan dengan cara seperti itu silahkan saja, tapi kuharap kamu konsisten dengan cara penilaian itu. Kemudian tolong camkan informasi di bawah ini. Di negeri ini, cerita silat karangan Asmaraman S. Kho Ping Hoo jauh lebih banyak dibaca orang ketimbang Tahafut al-Falasifah, karangan Al Ghazali pujaanmu itu. Maka kesimpulannya, mungkin apa yang ditulis oleh Ghazali dalam Tahafut al-Falasifah itu terlalu banyak ngawurnya, kalau dibandingkan cerita silat karya Asmaraman S. Kho Ping Hoo. Jadi mulai sekarang, kamu silahkan ambil dan percayai segala hikmah yang ada dalam buku Asmaraman S. Kho Ping Hoo dan jangan dengarkan apa kata Ghazali yang lebih banyak ngawurnya itu.
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Muhammad Hendra08 Mei 2010 22:49:06
"Sementara ilmu dunia,hanyalah fardlu kifayah yang kalau sudah ada orang Islam lain yang melakukannya, maka orang Islam sisanya sudah tidak lagi memiliki kewajiban untuk mempelajarinya." bagaimana kawan kau bisa menilai suatu tulisan yang dinyatakan dalam ihya ulumuddin dg pemikiran ilmu syariah yang kau miliki, tanpa ada tafsir atas pernyataan oleh sang mulia Imam-Ghozali..... sumber tulisanmu yang hanya memaparkan pendapat pribadi, kalo boleh bisa kah anda tulisakan pada halaman berapa dan bagaimana anda bisa menafsirkan secara keseluruhan tulisan bahwa kitab yang beliau karang bisa menyesatkan.....(sedang anda hnaya membaca terjemah atas kitab beliau)..... sayang sekali, berbagai fitnah yang kau nyatakan pada beliau tak menurunkan keagungan beliau sebagai seorang tokoh besar dalam era medieval keemasan islam, namun...... mohon sadarilah... sebenarnya banyak dari kami yang tidak simpatik dg teknik penyampaian yg kau paparkan........... salam.... mohon carilah mursyid, pintar bahasa arab, pintar ilmu fiqih, ilmu tasawuf agar penafsiran pribadi tak menjerumuskan...... kesombongan pribadi atas penafsiran yang didasarkan pada ilmu dan pengetahuan terbatas hanya akan mendatangkan keangkuhan.....
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nairazi aji16 Februari 2011 02:00:06
bang win... saya Lebih melihat Dsni mengenai filsafat al-Ghazali yaitu filsafat etika/hati..bagaimanapun al-Ghazali dalam pencariannya yaitu mengenai pencari kebenaran sejati dan ia mendapatkan kebenaran sejati itu dgn metode hati.. Dan saya pribadi tidak mau memungkirinya bahwa kemunculan filsafat al-Ghazali membuat kemunduran perkembangan teknologi dalam islam. dan saya rasa rasa mengapa al-Ghazali menekankan metode ini... salah satunya bahwa filsafat rasionalis itu hanya merupakan filsafat untuk orang2 tertentu dan tidak bisa dijadikan ideologi pada saat itu.. Bagaimanapun alat2 untuk mengungkapkan tafsiran yg tersembunyi dalam Islam, itu merupakan wilayah yg tidak terpikirkan pada saat itu...seperti makna mukjizat Rasul yg telah dikembangkan saat ini sehingga ia menjadi metode yg ilmiah dan tersistematis!!!! dan itu bukan merupakan filsafat bagi untuk semua kalangan... Bagaimanapun al-Ghazali berpendapat jika filsafat rasionalis dianut oleh kalangan semua umat islam pada saat itu...mungkin kehancuranLah yg akan terjadi!!!bahwa untuk menemukan kebenaran sejati itu hanya bisa ditempuh oleh hati...karena akal bersifat relativ dan ia akan selalu bereksperimen!!! Mungkin satu yg saya sesali dgn sejarah politik dlm Islam pada waktu itu ialah... kewajiban umat manusia dlm menetapkan sebuah ideologi dari cabang ilmu teologi!!! filsafat al-Ghazali dan ibn Rusyd merupakan hasil dari sebuah filsafat Hermetik.... al-Ghazali lebih memihak kepada filsafat Tuhan yg tidak terjangkau oleh akal dan pandangan. Ia tidak berhubungan dengan selak beluk alam. Alam tidak akan menunjukkan manusia untuk sampai kepada-Nya karena tidak ada hubungan antara Tuhan ini dengan alam.. sementara Ibn Rusyd lebih mengedepankan kepada filsafat tuhan yang menciptakan alam dan menampakkan diri dalam alam, sehingga bisa dijangkau melalui perenungan terhadap alam dan tatanannya. Siapa dan apa yang penampakannya lebih jelas dari Allah? Ia tidak menciptakan segala sesuatu kecuali agar ia bisa dilihat oleh seluruh makhluk-Nya..(Abid al-Jabiri, Kritik Nalar Arab) Dan saya pribadi lebih setuju jika metode yg dipakai sekarang dlm filsafat yaitu pengadopsian dalam filsafat keduanya, filsafat etika/hati dan filsafat rasional.... kita sebaiknya juga mengetahui bahwa kecanggihan teknologi dan ideologinya pada masa modern ini ialah merupakan kesalahan yg dibawa oleh murid2 ibn Rusdy(Averroisme) dan mereka telah mengkhianati ajaran sang guru(bahwa akal dan naql itu tdk bertentangan), yg lebih bersikap sekulerisme, komunisme, kapitalisme dsb. Karena hakikat dari manusia selalu bereksperimen dan mereka lebih meninggalkan wahyu agar lebih maju dlm sebuah pemikiran. bagaimanapun para pelajar muslim saat ini dituntut untuk berfilsafat rasional dan filsafat etika.... jika tidak, kita tidak ada bedanya dgn barat saat ini yg telah kehilangan moralnya dan kembali ke abad pertengahan yg selalu mementingkan akhirat sehingga dunia ditinggalkan dan kita akan selalu dijajah oleh Barat dalam ilmu sains/teknologi... Filsafat Rasional mempunyai keterbatasan yaitu Lambang yg ada pada Islam... "Bulan-Bintang"..Bulan dapat diamati dan diraih juga dikunjungi oleh manusia akan tetapi bintang hanya mampu diamati dan dipelajari dan ia mustahil untuk dicapai... bahwa alam materi ini selalu berhubungan dengan alam metafisika...
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dedi doler10 Mei 2011 00:35:24
Sangat menarik sekali perbincangan debat yang saya baca, Dan sepertinya anda2 ini sudah ahli dalam hal ini, Tapi bila kemudian tidak saling menghargai, lalu apa gunanya ilmu yang anda miliki, bila hanya untuk saling mengalahkan, saling menyalahkan dan merendahkan,. Sesungguhnya sangat amatlah tipis batas antara tulus dan riya.
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Win Wan Nur13 Juni 2011 18:29:21
@Jawir Julfikar Ya tentu saja saya mempelajari agama saya sendiri. Saya tidak pernah mengatakan bahwa filsafat menjadi sebab kemunduran/kehancuran islam pd masa silam. Sebaliknya, di sini saya memaparkan pandangan Ibnu Rushd bahwa justru dengan penolakan atas filsafat secara keras yang dilakukan oleh Al Ghazali lah yang menyebabkan Islam mengalami kemunduran di masa silam. Soal pertanyaan anda yang lain saya tidak berminat menanggapi, karena kalau saya tanggapi. Kita pasti akan jatuh ke dalam debat kusir. Sebab perdebatan soal ini sama sekali nggak nyambung, karena anda bicara dengan berdasarkan PRASANGKA, sementara saya bicara berdasarkan fakta yang ada.

Wednesday 24 June 2015

Wahabi contention Response

Wahabi contention: “It is very UN-scientific to take the ayah about Allah not resembling creation at face value and NOT take the ayah about istiwaa at face value. Why is one different from the other?”

Sunni Response: It is not clear to me what you mean by “face value”, but at least I will explain the difference between the two.

First of all, the basic principle for understanding the ayahs of the Quran and Hadiths of the Prophet is that they be taken at their most absolute, literal and apparent meanings, unless there is a proof why they shouldn’t. Such proofs would be other ayahs, other hadiths, and ijmaa, while mere preference is not acceptable for this. Sorting out these issues is the main purpose of Usul-al-Fiqh, the methodology for knowing commandments from the Quran and the Sunnah. The rational purpose of this rule of requiring a proof, as mentioned, is to avoid people interpreting the scriptures any way they like, while recognizing that not everything in the Quran can be understood literally, because that would lead to one ayah contradicting another in meaning.

If the rule of requiring proof for saying that an ayah should not be taken literally was not correct, then there would be no purpose in sending a prophet, because his message would have been open to any interpretation desired. For example, one time my non-Muslim friend watched this woman praying as Imam for Jumu`ah prayer in the US. She said, “Well, this is her interpretation,” implying that the woman is free to interpret from the scriptures that a woman can lead Jumu`ah prayer. I told her, “Interpretation has to have rules, if you were allowed to make any interpretation, then what would be the point in sending a prophet?” She could not answer.

In short, one’s understanding of a statement in the Quran should be apparent, unless there is a proof of otherwise from other texts, or ijma.

Having said that, the difference between “He does not resemble anything,” and “istawa” is that the first denies the resemblance of anything to Allah. The latter, on the other hand affirms “istawa”. To be consistent then, we need to affirm istawa without affirming resemblance to something physical, because created things are physical, i.e. limited and quantitative, and therefore in need of Allah to create them. That is why the Salaf said “istawa bi-laa kayf,” “istawa without a how”, but they did not say “He does not resemble His creation – without a how.” The first statement is an affirmation followed by a partial negation, the second statement is clearly nonsense.

This should be enough, but if you want the details……

Understanding “He does not resemble anything”
When we want to understand “He does not resemble anything,” we need to understand what meanings and senses are exclusive to creation. We also need to identify the meanings and senses that are shared in created attributes, so that we do not end up believing that Allah is different from His creation in the same sense as created things are different from each other only. After all, all created things are different from each other in some more or less obvious or subtle senses, even if it be only time or location. If we do not pay attention to this, we will end up saying that the meaning of the ayah is “everything is different from everything else,” and that would be to make it meaningless, which is clearly not allowed. After all, the statement addresses an attribute of Allah.

Before we do this, let it be clear that “He does not resemble anything,” is an attribute that negates something from Allah, which is different from an affirmation, such as “istawa” because we are forbidden from pondering meanings that are affirmed to Allah. We are not forbidden from pondering about creation, however, so there is nothing wrong with identifying what meanings and senses are present in creation that Allah is clearly not attributed with. Such meanings would be those that necessitate having a creator. Such pondering is encouraged in the Quran, such as in:

إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لَآَيَاتٍ لِأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ
Meaning: “Verily in the creation of the Skies and the Earth, and the differences of night and day there are signs for those who have perceptive minds.” (Aal `Imraan, 190)

أَفَلاَ يَنظُرُونَ إِلَى ٱلإِبْلِ كَيْفَ خُلِقَتْ
Meaning: “What, do they not consider how the camel was created?”

Based on this, when we look at creation, we notice that created things have quantities and limits, i.e. they have a physical measure. We also notice that they come in different shapes, types and resemblances in terms of these quantities and limits. They do not necessarily resemble each other in all aspects, for they have different time limits, locations, attributes, etc, but their nature of being limited and quantitative is shared. So a chair, for example, is very different from a human being, but similar in some aspects, such as in having a weight and a volume.

From this observation, we know that Allah is not something limited, not something measurable or quantitative, because Allah is not merely different from creation in the way they are different from each other. He is completely different from creation, and not something measurable, limited or quantitative. Allah’s attributes are greater than that.

Note that even when we use the same word to refer to a created attribute as we use for an attribute of Allah, such as knowledge, then we know that this is completely different in meaning. Allah’s knowledge is not something limited. It is not in a location, such as a brain, unlike ours. It does not increase or decrease, unlike ours. Our knowledge is quantitative an divisible, His is not etc.

We can also say it this way; the world around us is full of entities with size, even though they differ in attributes such as shape, density and taste, etc. The kind, however, things with size, is the same for them all. Since Allah is not the same kind as creation, then He is not something with size, and is not in a place. Further to this, we can also say that since place is a creation, as it is something other than Allah, He is not in it, because He existed before it.

To clarify further the meaning of “He does not resemble anything,” take the proof of Abu Hanifah that you linked, which points out an absurdity to an atheist: “You cannot imagine one ship running without some one looking after its affairs. Yet you think that for this whole world, which runs exactly and precisely, there is no one who looks after it, and no one owns it?” Take also a look at the proof of Allah’s existence that Ash-Shafi`i presented: “The leaves of Toot (berries) are all but one. Each leaf tastes exactly the same. Insects, honey bees, cows, goats, and deer live off of it. After eating these the insects produce silk; bees produce honey; deer give musk (a special kind of scent), cows and goats deliver off-springs.” Maalik said it this way: “Difference in languages, difference in pitches of voice, difference in singing are proof that Allah (subhanahu wa ta`ala) exists!”

Such proofs are called arguments based on design, the order of creation, and they are also found in the Quran. The Quran does not have logically flawed proofs, so we can safely assume that they are valid. If you look carefully at these proof, and others like it, then you can detect what it means that Allah does not resemble His creation. This is because when you specify the attributes of creation that makes it so obvious that it needs a creator, then you can know what attributes the Creator does not have. You can know this, because Allah does not have a Creator.

The common denominator of all these proofs is that they give examples of how creations need physical specification for how they are to be. What kind? What location? What volume? What quantity? What size? What shape? How wide? What color? What taste? What temperature? What boundaries and limits? Where? How fast? Etc. All such attributes need specification. So in Abu Hanifah’s, for example, he proposes that the ship has goods (specification needed: what kind? how many? where?) that the ship keeps going back and forth (what direction, what speed? to and from where? what path?), etc.

Clearly such attributes need a creator, because they need to receive specification. This means that they have a beginning, because becoming specified needs a point in time. Clearly then, Allah is not something that physical specification applies to, so He is not a body, and therefore not in a place, because a body is what is in a place. The great scholar of the Salaf At-Tahaawi stated:

{Allah is above} the status of {having limits, extremes, corners, limbs or instruments.}

{The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him, like all created things}.

This same thing was stated by the most eloquent of all creation, as narrated by Muslim and Al-Bayhaqi:

اللهم أنت الْأَوَّلُ فَلَيْسَ قَبْلَكَ شَيْءٌ وَأَنْتَ الْآخِرُ فَلَيْسَ بَعْدَكَ شَيْءٌ وَأَنْتَ الظَّاهِرُ فَلَيْسَ فَوْقَكَ شَيْءٌ وَأَنْتَ الْبَاطِنُ فَلَيْسَ دُونَكَ شَيْءٌ
“O Allah, You are the First, so there is nothing before You, and You are the Last so there is nothing after You. You are Al-Thaahir so there is nothing above You. And You are Al-Baatin, so there is nothing below you.” If there is nothing above Him and nothing below Him, then he is not a body or a direction, and He does not have physical specification.

Further to this point, consider what was narrated from Ahmad ibn Hanbal at the link you provided, where he made an example of the egg with a chick in it, saying: “There is an incredibly strong fort, it has no doors, there is no way to get in. In fact, there is not even a hole in it. From outside it glows like the moon and from inside it shimmers like gold. It is sealed from all sides, matter of fact it is air tight. Suddenly one of its doors breaks down, a living thing with eyes and ears, a beautiful looking animal appears yelling and wandering all over. So is not there a creator who made it possible for life to take place in this secured and closed fort? And is not this Creator better than humans? This Creator has no limit.” Note that he concluded based on his proof: “This Creator has no limit.”

Why one cannot say that “He does not resemble anything,” except in that He has a direction
Another difference between “He does not resemble anything,” and “istawa” is that the first is clear in meaning, while the second is not; “istawa” has many possible meanings in Arabic. To get agreement between the two is therefore easy, you understand “He does not resemble anything,” absolutely and literally, and say that the meaning of “istawa” is one of the meanings in Arabic that does not contradict with “He does not resemble anything.” So it does not have the meaning of Allah being in a place or direction, because that would mean He has a physical limit, and that would be to invalidate “He does not resemble anything”, and render it meaningless without a need.

Yet another reason why place or direction cannot be excluded from the literal “He does not resemble anything” is the explicit scriptural text mentioned earlier, namely that the Prophet said:

اللهم أنت الْأَوَّلُ فَلَيْسَ قَبْلَكَ شَيْءٌ وَأَنْتَ الْآخِرُ فَلَيْسَ بَعْدَكَ شَيْءٌ وَأَنْتَ الظَّاهِرُ فَلَيْسَ فَوْقَكَ شَيْءٌ وَأَنْتَ الْبَاطِنُ فَلَيْسَ دُونَكَ شَيْءٌ
“O Aļļaah, You are the First, so there is nothing before You, and You are the Last so there is nothing after You. You are Al-Thaahir so there is nothing above You. And You are Al-Baatin, so there is nothing below you.”

If there is nothing above Him and nothing below Him, then He is not in a place or direction, so if one believed istawa to have the meaning of Allah literally being in a place or direction, then one would have rendered the perfectly clear “He does not resemble anything” virtually meaningless, as all creation as we know it is in a place and direction by nature of being limited and quantitative. One would also have contradicted the perfectly clear “”You are Al-Thaahir so there is nothing above You. And You are Al-Baatin, so there is nothing below you.”

Note that this hadith is a praise of Aļļaah, and that His names and attributes are attributes of perfection and greatness. Being in a place or direction is not an attribute of perfection; being physically in a high place is not greatness, because if it was, then Tibet would better than Makkah. Moreover, being in a physical direction necessitates having a limit. The Prophet then, made it clear in this ĥadiitħ that Allah’s aboveness mentioned in other texts is not one of direction.

Finally, by claiming that “istawa” means being physically above, one would have affirmed a limit to the creator and thereby claimed it possible for limited things to exist without a creator. By doing this one would have contradicted the proofs for Allah’s existence, because one would no longer be able to say that nothing limited can exist without a creator. One would also have insulted Allah by attributing to Him a limit.

How to deal with the meaning of “istawa”
The best solution then, is that one simply says “istawa” to affirm the attribute and then “without a how” to comply with “He does not resemble anything”. This way one is left with the various possible Arabic meanings of “istawa” that are not physical in meaning, and one has not contradicted these other very clear and specific texts (and a number of others). In other words, one has avoided restricting the literal meaning of “He does not resemble anything” and “O Allah, You are Al-Thaahir so there is nothing above You. And You are Al-Baatin, so there is nothing below you.” Last, but not least, one has also avoided affirming a limit to Allah which would contradict this aayah, among many others:

اللَّهُ لا إِلَهَ إِلا هُوَ لَهُ الْأَسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَى
Meaning “There is no god but Him, He has the best names.” (Taahaa, 8 )

One does not necessarily, however, assign any specific one of those non-physical meanings to “istawa”, because it is not clear in the Arabic language which one is meant, and the meaning is not well known. For this reason, most of the Salaf left it at saying “istawa without a how,” and usually did not interpret the non-physical meaning left after saying “without a how”. This was for fear of speaking about Allah without a proof, and ending up assigning a meaning that was not meant, thereby denying the one that was actually meant, or ta`tiil, as is it called in Arabic.

Note that when the Salaf said “istawa bi-laa kayf,” they did not mean “without knowing the physical how that is really there,” as some think. Literally, bi-laa kayf means, “bi-(with) laa (categorically no) kayf (how.)” Since they knew Arabic very well, and knew Allah, this was all they needed to say as it made it clear that Allah is not something physical or temporal. This is not the case with most people today. And there is nothing wrong also in detailing what “kayf” means, because the great scholar of the Salaf At-Tahaawiy stated:

{Allah is above} the status of {having limits, extremes, corners, limbs or instruments.}

{The six directions} up, down, front, back, left and right {do not contain Him} because that would make Him {like all created things}.

He also agreed that believing that anything else is an insult to Islam, for he said:

{Whoever attributed to Allah an attribute that has a meaning among the meanings that apply to humans has committed blasphemy.}

Note that he said this after having already pointed out that the six directions apply to all created things, which includes humans.

I hope I have managed to make it clear now that denying istawa to be a physical attribute does not mean denying istawa. If you want more on this, and to prevent this dialogue to degenerate into an explanation of every scripture that might be taken to be physical in meaning, you can look at Ibn Al-Jawzi’s “Daf’ Shubah al-Tashbhi”, which has been translated to English under the name “The Attributes of God”. I haven’t seen the translation myself, but here are a couple of quotes I have translated for you myself from the Arabic version: “And they (the corrupt Hanbalis) made Allah’s aboveness physical, and forgot that physical aboveness can only be for a body, or an indivisible element, and that aboveness can be used for the meaning of high status, for one may say for example, ’so and so is above so and so’.” In other words, Ibn Al-Jawzi is saying that in no way shape or form is the denial of physical direction and physical aboveness a denial of an aboveness that is not physical. Physical aboveness is refuted, however, as it is a limited aboveness, because it involves at least one physical limit. For example, if someone says that Allah is physically above the `Arsh (throne), then he is saying that Allah has a limit adjacent to the throne.

Then Ibn Al-Jawziyy narrated from Ahmad ibn Hanbal that he said: “istawa is an attribute no doubt, and it does not mean purpose or control,” and that, “Ahmad refuted that Allah should have a direction, because directions cannot be without something other than them,” i.e. something physical to be in a direction. Then Ibn Al-Jawzi said, “Since the claim that Allah has a direction is false, then it is clear that He is not in a place.” Then he clarified this by saying “because Allah is not surrounded by anything, and He does not have attributes with a beginning.”

Note, however, that when some later scholars saw the activities of deviants trying to use the silence of the scholars regarding istawa in order to spread the falsehood that Allah is physical, some of them, or more of them, decided to mention specific non-physical meanings, such as control. This happened also to some extent among the Salaf. This was to calm the minds of the uneducated (who were far from the mindset and linguistic capability of the Companions of the Prophet) so that they would not keep thinking about this issue. They did this because, although most of them felt they had no certain knowledge of the specific meaning of istawa, and that the safest approach is to keep silent when one does not have certain knowledge of such a matter, this was considered a minor concern compared to the danger of having people believing Allah to be something in a place or a direction.

Note also that whether the non-physical meaning of scripture texts that have apparent physical meanings are known or not, is sometimes a matter of disagreement. So for example, many scholars interpreted the literally translated, “He is with you wherever you are,” as “in the sense of knowledge,” I.e. Allah knows about you, and what you do, wherever you are. Clearly this aayah is also not literally meant.

The Quran and hadith texts are full of such figurative expressions, and they are widely known. They did not cause confusion among the Companions, simply because they knew that Allah is not limited, as He does not have a Creator. They knew their Creator in other words, so physical meanings did not even enter their minds, just like when you heard the AT&T commercial “reach out and touch someone,” you knew that it was not literally meant, because you know what a telephone is.

Author: Shaykh Abu Adam al Naruiji