THE MYTH OF THE LAZY NATIVE

Mahathir menggunakan isu pembayaran balik PTPTN sebagai contoh untuk kata semua kaum Melayu sebagai malas.

Sikap malas yang dikaitkan dengan orang Melayu pernah dikupas oleh Allahyarham Professor Syed Hussein Alatas dalam dua bukunya , Siapa Salah Dan Myth of the Lazy Natives.

Kata Professor Alatas, sikap sebahagian orang Melayu tidak wajar menjadi rumusan atau memberi gambaran menyuruh tentang sikap umum orang Melayu.

Beliau bertanya, apakah "Melayu condong mencuri kerana sebahagian orang mencuri, Melayu malas sebab sebahagian orang malas, wanita Melayu tidak mentaati suami kerana sebahagian orang berbuat demikian, orang Melayu gila sebab sebahagian orang Melayu begitu? "

Jika Kita membuat andaian umum tentang perwatakan sebuah masyarakat berdasarkan tindakan/ perlakuan berberapa individual, Kita berada dalam kebingungan yang besar, " kata Professor Alatas dalam buku tersebut (Lihat Myth of the Lazy Natives, muka 174)

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are  more restricted. The negative traits of Malay character discussed by Mahathir are  either an  exaggeration or misplaced judgements.  For instance,  he suggested that the Malays are frank  only towards those they  can absolutely  rely  upon, and this  happens to  be their  own people. This is nothing strange; in  this, every community has this attitude.  Who would express unpleasant  and unpalatable remarks about other communities to  members of  that community, except those without moral restraints like the Nazis and white American racists?  Most communities,  both  in  Asia and  the  West,  have  a sense  of  politeness, or restraint. This is not  peculiar to  the Malays. Another exaggeration  or misplaced judgement is  Mahathir's  evaluation  of amok in the psychological  make-up  of the Malays. To  begin with, the  phenomenon described  as amok is  not  confined  to  the  Malays. Chinese and  Indians have  been known to kill members of  their family  in  a  state  of  mental pathology.  Furthermore this  phenomenon  has substantially  decreased amongst Malays owing  to  a change  of historical conditions.  A situation of extreme  mental oppression exercised  against a  person, as for instance, a  Buginese  slave cruelly  treated in  a Dutch  household in  18th century  Batavia, is  no more common. In addition, Mahathir  was wrong to  consider  certain phenomena pertaining  to  some  individuals  as indicating  the  character  of  a  collectivity. The Japanese soldiers  during the Second  World  War  were  very  rarely  captured.  They  preferred  to commit suicide rather than  surrender. But  the Japanese  nation  did surrender,  and did  not commit suicide. The sense of  honour  which governed  the  conduct  of  individual  Japanese  soldiers impelling them  to commit  suicide rather than  surrender, did  not govern  the conduct of  the Japanese nation. Hence we  cannot  say  that  suicide in  the  face of  defeat is a basic trait in  the Japanese  national  character.

If  we generalize about the character  of  a community  on the basis of the action of  a few individuals, then  we  are in  for real confusion. Malays are prone to steal because some  steal; Malays are lazy because some  are; Malay women are  disloyal  to their husbands  because some are; Malays are mad because some  are;  Malays are  ganja  smokers because some  are. So  we "can indefinitely enumerate the negative traits of  the Malay community based  on  the fact  that some  Malays at some times have  exhibited  these  traits. Although  mental disorders exist among  particular communities, they cannot be automatically considered  as  part of the  psychological  make-up of  the particular community. Amongst  the Chinese in  Singapore and Malaysia  there is  a mental  disorder  called

THE DISTORTION  OF MALAY CHARACTER 175

"koro"., a shrinking  of  the  genital,  predominantly  amongst  males. Just because it is primarily confined to  the Chinese community, can  we say that  the loss  of  potency, the shrinking  of the  vital  organ, is  part  of  the basic  psychological  make-up  of  the Chinese?  Such  a conclusion  would be a  highly  absurd  and  muddled  one.  Koro  has  nothing  to  do  with Chinese character or the Chinese "dilemma".  All it points  out  is that a small number of  Chinese  males are  prone to  it. Cultural and psychological  factors may  explain  it although the cultural  factors may not  have a  direct  influence.  But  this  has  nothing  to  do  with  the collective character  of a  community.

What  Mahathir  and the  Revolusi Mental  attempted  to  do  was strictly speaking, a national character  study. There are serious problems connected  with  national  character study  which  have  baffled the  best brains  in  social sciences, one of these is the definition of  national character.

The  difficulty  of  defining  the national character is  due  to the  fact that there are many classes in society with  their  sub-cultures,  there are also the differentiations  into  age  groups, into  male and  female, and  into responses which arise from  the national character in a given situation, or  responses which  arise  from  the situation only, without  the dominant influence  of the national  character. It  has  been successfully  shown  by Ruth  Benedict  that  Japanese  society, for instance,  was permeated through  and  through by  the psychology  of hierarchy.  "In  the  family  and in  personal relations, age,  generation,  sex, and class dictate proper behaviour.  In  government, religion,  the  Army, and industry, areas  are carefully separated into  hierarchies where  neither  the higher nor  the lower may without penalty overstep  their prerogatives. As long  as 'proper station'  is maintained  the Japanese carry  on  without  protest. They feel safe. They are of course often  not  'safe'  in  the sense that their best good is protected  but they are 'safe'  because they have accepted hierarchy as legitimate. It  is  as characteristic of  their judgement on  life as trust in equality and  free enterprise  is  of  the American  way of  life."15 Here the author isolated a trait in  the national character  of Japan that dominated Japanese  behaviour.  She noted that  it  was Japan's  mistake to try and  apply  it outside to  the conquered territories. The conquered nations were expected  to accept their lower station in the scheme  of things. This  was of course resented.  I have  myself witnessed  this passion  for hierarchy  and organization  in  Java during  the  Japanese occupation (1942—1945). The concept  of  Asia  for the  Asians held  by the Japanese, the "saudara tua", or  elder  brother,

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w,as basically  a  manifestation  of hierarchy. Kawasaki noted that the Japanese operate best as a group. Decisions in  a firm  are usually in the nature of a consensus.I6  These are some  instances which can be considered  as constituent elements making  up  a  national character. They  dominate the psychology  of  the  entire nation. They are transmitted  through  the socialization  process; they are understood and taken for  granted;;  their prevalence is  not  confined  to  a  section  of the community  but  generally  to  all.  It  is  however,  not  always  possible to delineate the national character  of  every nation  or community.

The  point  we  wish  to  stress is that it is possible in  some  instances to speak of  national character  but the  problems  are great.  We shall not deny  the  possibility of  the Malays having a national character but  the constituent elements, with  possibly one  or two  exceptions, are certainly not  those cited by  Mahathir  and the  Revolusi Mental.  A  great deal of expert research  is  required  to establish trait by  trait  the  national character  of  the Malays beyond  what is  obvious and of no  profound consequence. For  instance, Malays  on  the  whole are  soft-spoken, averse to  shouting  in  conversation. A radical, heated and open  dispute  between individuals  or  groups is  often avoided although  not  the  dispute itself. There is a Malay  manner  for  conducting and  settling  disputes,  but  even this is not  a  hundred  per cent  true.  In  the  past, Malay rulers have  fought against  each  other in  direct  and  heated  manner.  Similarly  religious disputes  have  been  conducted in  this  way.  Without  denying  the possibility of  a Malay national character, we wish  to  point  out  here that the traits selected  by Mahathir  and the  Revolusi  Mental  are  by no means those  of  the  national character. The  history and  current condition  of the Malays  contradicts the  assertion that  they  were incapable  of  hard  work, lacked discipline,  and punctuality,  while indulging in entertaining talks, etc. The authors mistook the  actions  of  certain Malays  for a  general expression  of the Malay  community. Referring to  the Japanese  national character, Hasegawa suggested that  it was less the property of  a particular  class  than of the  whole  fration. A value,  such as  the sense  of propriety in  doing  things, may originate in  the upper class but  if it extends to  the  entire nation  it becomes part of  the  national character.17 Values  such  as laziness, indiscipline,  non-punctuality, are  not upheld  by Malay society. Neither  is  running amok a collectively accepted mode  of reaction  to  difficult situations. It .is merely evidence  of  a mental breakdown which affects some  individual  Malays. It  cannot  be considered  part of the  Malay  national character.   Suggesting

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a psycho-pathological disorder  as part  of the  Malay collective tendency is a continuation of colonial thinking.  As  we had  noted  earlier it was the British  colonial administrator Clifford  who  claimed  that the psycho-pathological  disorder  called  latah  was inherent  in  the  Malay psychology.18  What  Mahathir  did was to  use amok instead of  latah  as an element in the Malay  community's  psychological  make-up;  the suggestion has  a  colonial  ring about  it. We earlier noted  the impossibility of  considering  such  disorders as part of the  national character of  any community. The  reasons are as follows: it is not  purposefully transmitted  by  the community; it does not  govern  collective responses towards  national problems; it  is not shared  by  the overwhelming  majority, and  it  is  not  the  approved or tacitly accepted mode of reaction.  Only such  values, attitudes, and modes of  reaction  conforming  to  the positive requirements of  the above may be  considered  as the constituent elements of  the national character.

If many  Englishmen get  drunk, and  stagger  on the street,  making a lot of  noise, this in  itself does  not  represent  part of  the  English  national character.  Only  if it can be  shown  that the  collective English reaction to  national  crises is  somewhat  conditioned  by  the peculiar  phenomenon of  drunkenness, that  this  phenomenon  is  a deep-seated  national sentiment pervading  English  life, can  we presume that particular form of  drunkenness to  be part  of  the English national  character. Individual Englishmen can be drunkards^  whose  life is  entirely dominated by the bottle. But  one can hardly conclude  that  this is a basic trait in  the English  character. Mahathir's unfamiliarity  with  social sciences made him  suggest  amok to  be  a  basic part  of  the  Malay  psychology.

One last word  about national character. It is not  to  be  confused  with religion,  culture, rituals, institutions,  practices or  situations  as such, although  all or  some  may  contribute to  the formation of  national character  at  a  given point  in  a nation or  community's  history.  Salvador de Madariaga  stressed the  predominance  of the intellectual element in French collective life as compared  to  that of the English.  The French state, in  his  opinion, marked  an  attempt to  impose an  intellectual order. "While in  English  collective life questions  are solved at the very moment  when  they arise and  by  virtue  of  the very vital instinct which makes them  arise, in  France, the  whole  collective life is regulated beforehand and all cases are foreseen.  This  watch  must naturally have  a watchmaker.  The State is in France  the  watchmaker in chief of the social mechanism.  Thus  it is that  the tendency so  typically French towards centralizing  all  public

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functions in the State appears as a natural consequence of French intellectualism.  Let us  remember in  passing that it was an intellectual class which  initiated  and  completed  in  France the centralization  of authority."19  No  doubt  French  culture and history  had contributed to  the role  of  French  intellectualism but  it became  part of  the national character  only after it had  significantly influenced  French  life. The mere presence  of  an  intellectual element in  a community does not make that element supreme in  the  national life of that community. The more so a  psychopathological  disorder  like amok.

There  are  numerous  weaknesses in both  the  Revolusi  Mental  and Mahathir's book. I  have  published  a detailed  and  separate criticism of the  Revolusi Mental  in  Malay.20  It  would  digress  too much  from  the main  theme of  this book  if  all the erroneous statements from, the two works were to  be  discussed.  However Mahathir's  idea  on  the  racial inferiority of  the Malays requires a comment.  What he  said  about this was all  vague.  In  other  parts of  his  book  he cited environmental influences.  He  believed in  the racial  inferiority  of the Malays  without actually specifying  in  detail where that inferiority lay. He did  not say that the Malays were  incapable of  becoming  good  businessmen  or professionals but  he invoked  a general  racial  explanation to  account  for the lag in  capitalist  development  amongst  the Malays. His use  of the survival of the  fittest hypothesis was inconsistent.  While he  applied  it to explain the emergence  of  hardy individuals  amongst the Chinese in  the mainland, he  did not  apply  it  to  the Malays.  Amongst  the Malays, there was also a serious struggle  for existence.  Malay fishing and ricefarming  were  not  as easy  as Mahathir  suggested. The Malay village community  had to  struggle  much harder against  diseases  in the  preIndependence  days.  Haynes,  a member of the Malayan Civil Service, in his memorandum  to  the Rice Cultivation  Committee of  1931, wrote the following: "I speak  from  considerable  personal experience  when  I say that  there are many  deaths of  small  children amongst  this  population which occur from  avoidable causes. Recently  when I was  walking over some  padi  fields  where the population was  clearly a healthy one  I asked the only  two  Malay  householders  whom  I saw  how  many  children they had  had and  how many  had died.  One  replied that  he  had  had five children out  of  whom  three had died;  and the other  replied  that  he had had  eight  children  out  of  whom  five  had  died.  The  fathers  were  both padi  planters,  and  fine strong  healthy  men. These are merely  samples of many  cases which  have come  within my personal notice in places which are  off the  beaten track of  doctors  and health  officers."21

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Mahathir was  also  aware of the high  mortality rate, particularly among infants.  Why did not the survival of  the  fittest theory work amongst the Malays  as it  did  amongst  the Chinese?  The explanation  of  cultural phenomena in  terms of  race  and  Darwin's  evolutionary  theory  have long  been discredited in the social  sciences.  It  does  not apply to  China either.  For thousands  of years the Chinese  peasants  had to  cope  with difficulties. Yet it was only recently that advances  were made in their social  and economic  progress.

It is true that  the soil is'  conducive to cultivation, but this  did  not mean an easy life for the farmers.  The farmers had to fight continuously against  weeds, insects  and  pests. The  great  majority  had also to  fight  indebtedness.  As  late  as 1966,  when  the  government  had taken more interest in  assisting  the  rice-farmers, crops  were reported everywhere to  have  been  attacked  by  rats  and  other  pests.  In  one area about  25% of the  crop was damaged  by  pests,22  and  in  earlier periods the damage was even  greater.  50 to  60%  of  the damage was caused  by rats;  there  were  also  birds and  floods.

In the  1931  it  was found that  indebtedness in  different  regions  varied between  40  and  90%  of the  farming population. "Indebtedness takes two  forms, namely, to  Chetties and others  for mortgages  on  land  and to Chinese shop-keepers and  others  for advances either in  cash  or in  kind to  assist the cultivators  during  the period  the crop  is growing.  Of the two,  the latter is by  far the  most widespread  and  pernicious. It is commonly found  that on  this  system  cultivators  obtain  goods during  the growing  period  of  the  crop  and  when  repayment  is  made at  the time of the harvest, the price they receive results  in  the producers  being paid  at a figure which is far below  the true  market value of  the produce."23 This situation  prevailed  for at least half a century; and  since 1966 the situation  has  deteriorated. In  an  area  where  off farm  employment opportunity is  favourable as in  Malacca, the  estimated annual average income  of the  farmer was  MS  1,628,  the  family  expenses were M$ 1,561, and the net  saving  was M$66. However the annual  average borrowing was MS963.  About  83%  of  the farmers in  this  area borrowed, and  about  66%  of  the loan  was  for  consumption  purposes, namely  for  food  and clothes.  The  bulk of  the loan  was in  kind,  from  the provision  shops. This loan  alone  constituted 68-5%  of  all loans, for the Malacca area.

The indirect  rate  of interest  per annum  charged by  the  provision shops in  the  form  of higher prices on advances in  kind  was estimated to  be  205%,  while  interest  p'n cash from  the  pawn  shop  was  25%. Generally  the farmer was able  to  pay  about  70% of  his debt  at  the end of the year.  All these  factors indicate that the

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life of a Malay rice farmer is not as  easy  and simple as suggested  by Mahathir.  Furthermore if  they  were easy  going they  would  not  become  a profitable target for creditors. Here is another motivation  for the Malay farmer to  work  hard, to  pay  his debt. "It  should  be  observed  that although  provision shops provided  more'  than 80  per cent  of the total credit  required  by  farmers, only  a small percentage of  such  debts remained  unpaid  and  was carried  down  to the following  year. Most of the debts due to  provision  shops  were repaid  at  the end  of  the year;  for farmers fear  that  if  such  debts remain  unpaid  at  the end  of  every  month, shop-keepers  would not allow  them  further credit."24  The Rice Committee of  1956  listed  the following  conditions  for the unduly small returns  of  the  rice farmer:  widespread  and'  heavy  indebtedness and the exorbitant  interest  charges  paid  by  the producers;  the lack  of organized credit facilities; excessive  marketing  costs and  margins, and malpractices by marketing  functionaries and intermediaries; lack  of recognized  standards  of  quality; inadequate and  defective storage facilities;  lack  of  producers' organizations  for  financing, processing, storing and  distributing, and  poor  communications in  rural  areas.25  It is such  factors  which explain the slow  progress of  the Malays in  emerging from  a  peasant  society rather than the allegedly negative traits of  their natural character  or  any  hereditary qualities.

To  summarize  therefore, it  would appear that both the  Revolusi Mental  and  Mahathir  painted a  distorted picture of  the Malay community. At  best this picture reflects the life of  the ruling  elites, and was by  no  means a reflection  of  the Malay community. The foundation of their reasoning  was loose and their  knowledge  of  facts limited. Their interpretation  is  faulty and  their thinking  an extension  of  the colonial ideology. They  have ignored  many  elements  from  Malay  culture and history  which stressed  the  values  for progress.  They  have also  confused the cultural and  the  historical. This  we  shall treat in  the following chapter.  The absence of  the Malay  trading  class in  Malaysia now is a consequence of historical factors,  not a result of  the Malay system  of values.

The Second  Malaysia  Plan  1971—1975,  aims  at  creating a Malay entrepreneurial  class in  20 years'  time, when  30  per cent  of  the country's business and industry  should  be owned'  and run by  Malays.26  The Plan is  indirectly  an  admission of  the failure  of  previous  planning.  After  14 years of independence, Malay participation in  business and  industry is negligible. The  Revolusi Mental  prepares the climate for an eventual failure of the  Second Malaysia  Plan.  If it  fails to  achieve its targets, the attitude  of the  Malays

THE DISTORTION  OF MALAY CHARACTER 181

is to  blame.  We are  here  not assessing the actual  performance of the Malaysian government, we are only  tracing the  ideological motivational  root  of  the  Revolusi Mental.  The degradation of  the Malay character is an  attempt by  the ruling  party to absolve itself from blame for real  or expected  failures  to  ensure  the progress  of  the Malay community.  Government  publications and the  pronouncements  of various leaders have  never  made any  reference to  serious failures  or shortcomings.  This issue  requires  a separate  study. Suffice it to  say there is  a growing anxiety  amongst  the Malay leaders in  power that the situation of  the  Malays  have not  substantially improved. Publicly they do  not admit that this is largely on  account  of  corruption,  nepotism, bad  implementation  of  plans, and  lack  of  institutional innovation. Their statements throughout the years that  the  people must  respond indicate their anxiety that the people  are not  responding. Of course to assess this we have  to  know  the issues, only  then  can  we attribute responsibility either to the people  or to the government. I have  in  this book  merely attempted  to  prove  the existence of this anxiety and  its function  as a motivational source to  paint the Malay community in negative colours, so  that the  latter can  be  held  responsible if the  party in  power fails to  realize  its declared  objectives.

NOTES

1. Dato Sedia Raja  Abdullah,  "The  Origin of Pawang and Berpuar  Ceremony." JMBRAS,  vol.  V, pt.  2,  November,  1927.  In  connection with  magical and superstitious  practices in farming, he said: "In conclusion, I cannot  refrain from remarking it is idle to hope for  the economic progress of  the Malays  so long as this and similar  beliefs prevail among them.  Where those beliefs are deep  rooted, science cannot  make  much headway, for superstitions and scientific truths  cannot exist side by side. It is difficult, if  not impossible, to deal scientifically with pests if damage to crops  is believed to be due  to the ravages of  evil spirits." P.  313.

2.  Syed Hussein Alatas, "Erti Kemajuan  Masharakat".  Utusan Melayu.  October  7, 1959,  Kuala Lumpur.  Here  was stated: "Every  great change in  history,  every revolution that occurred, has always been preceded by a great psychological change. There is no  change in history which is not preceded by a change in  man's conception towards life." The basic  themes of  the  Revolusi Mental  are found  in this article,  minus the treatment on Malay character.  It  deals with the concept of progress, the attitudes required, and the  methods to achieve it. Though  economic change is a  major objective,  economism  should not  be the dominant  method of analysis.

3.  Syed Hussein Alatas,  "Sekitar  Bahasa  dan Kebudayaan Melayu."  p. 82.  Dewcn Bahasa,  IV,  no.  2,  February,  1960,  Kuala Lumpur.

4. Syed Hussein Alatas, "Sejarah Melayu berisi Unsur2  yang tidak Sehat dari  Segi Falsafah Perjuangan Islam."  Angkatan Bant,  October  1965,  Kuala Lumpur.  The lecture was  printed in this  monthly.

5. Ibid.

6. Syed Hussein Alatas, "Collective Representations and Economic Development". Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia, vol. II, no. 1, June, 1965, Kuala Lumpur. The following is suggested. "Collective representations in the realms of politics, medicine, technology, agriculture, fishing, reclamation of lands, building, transportation, etc. with their mystic participation, are, to my mind, one of the great influences bringing about the stagnation and underdevelopment of Southeast Asian societies. They possess the greatest of significance in the day to day life of the people. Before we can hope to achieve large scale and positive changes in the social and economic conditions of the Southeast Asian peoples, we must bring about a change of outlook, a mental revolution." Pp. 106-107. The way in which magical and superstitious beliefs influence development is discussed.

7. See Syed Hussein Alatas, "Feudalism in Malaysian Society: A Study in Historical Continuity", in Civilizations, vol. XVIII, no. 4, 1969. 8. Rezeki is from Arabic. It means sustenance, bounty, livelihood. The Revolusi Mental noted seven sayings to show that the Malays believe in fate. See op. cit., p. 69- Maxwell, a great collector of Malay proverbs, did not see any fatalism in this. The saying, he said, described "one who is just able to support himself, whose daily earnings enable him to live but not to save." See W. E. Maxwell, "Malay Proverbs", p. 150. ./.$fi&4.$, no. 2, 1878. 9. W. E. Maxwell, "Malay Proverbs", p. 90. JSBRAS, no. 1, July, 1878. 

10. I had earlier discussed the presence of punctuality as a value in some traditional societies in refutation of Herskovits' generalization on the Sudan. See my contribution, "Modernization and National Consciousness", in Ooi Jin-Bee, Chiang Hai Ding (eds.), Modern Singapore. University of Singapore, Singapore, 1969.

11. S. Selvadurai, Ani bin Arope, Nik Hassani bin Mohammad, Socio-Economic Study of Padi Fairns in the Kemubu Area ofKelantan, 1968, p. 91. Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Kuala Lumpur, 1969.

12. Udhis Narkswadi, S. Selvadurai, Economic Survey of Padi Production in West Malaysia, Report no. 1, Selangor, p. 143, table 37. Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Kuala Lumpur, 1967.

13. Udhis Narkswasdi, S. Selvadurai, Economic Survey of Padi Production in West Malaysia, Report no. 2, Collective Padi Cultivation in Bachang Malacca, pp. 144-146. Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Kuala Lumpur, 1967. 14. S. Selvadurai, Ani bin Arope, Nik Hassani bin Mohammad, Socio-Economic Study of Padi Farms in the Kemubu Area of Kelantan, 1968, p. 91, op. cit.

15. Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, pp. 66-67. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967.

16. Ichiro Kawasaki, Japan Unmasked, p. 188. Charles E. Tuttle,Tokyo, 1970. 17. Nyozekan Hasegawa, The Japanese Character pp. 16-17. Tr. John Bester. Kbdansha International, Tokyo, 1965.

18. Hugh Clifford, Studies in Brown Humanity, pp. 195-196, op. cit. 

19. Salvador de Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards. Oxford University Press, London, 1949, p. 37.

20. Syed Hussein Alatas, Siapa Yang Salah. Pustaka Nasional, Singapura. 1972.

21. Report of the Rice Cultivation Committee, vol. I, p. 53. Federated Malay States Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1931.

22. Udhis Narkswasdi, S. Selvadurai, Economic Survey of Padi Production in West Malaysia, Report no. 3. Malacca, p. 35. Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Kuala Lumpur,J967. 

23. Report of the Rice Cultivation Committee, vol. I, p. 40, op. cit.

24. Udhis Narkswasdi, S. Selvadurai, Report no. 3, Malacca, p. 147, op. cit. In Malacca the average rate of interest from provision shops was 267-5 per cent, seep. 157.

25. Final Report of the Rice Committee, p. 16. Federation of Malaya, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1956.

26. For a critical analysis see Syed Hussein Alatas, The Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975: A Critique, Occasional Paper no. 15, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1972.